FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION

Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

CATEGORY: COMPUTER SECURITY

SUBCATEGORY: CRYPTOGRAPHY

Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900

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FOREWORD

The Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Series of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is the official series of publications relating to standards and guidelines adopted and promulgated under the provisions of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002.

Comments concerning FIPS publications are welcomed and should be addressed to the Director, Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8900, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900.

, Director Information Technology Laboratory

Abstract

This Standard specifies a suite of algorithms that can be used to generate a digital signature. Digital signatures are used to detect unauthorized modifications to data and to authenticate the identity of the signatory. In addition, the recipient of signed data can use a digital signature in proving to a third party that the signature was, in fact, generated by the claimed signatory. This is known as non-repudiation, since the signatory cannot repudiate the signature at a later time.

Key words: computer security, cryptography, digital signatures, Federal Information Processing Standards, public key cryptography.

Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-3

<approval date> 2006

Announcing the

DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD (DSS)

Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS PUBS) are issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) after approval by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-106), and the Computer Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235).

1. Name of Standard: Digital Signature Standard (DSS) (FIPS 186-3).

2. Category of Standard: Computer Security. Subcategory. Cryptography.

3. Explanation: This Standard specifies algorithms for applications requiring a digital signature, rather than a written signature. A digital signature is represented in a computer as a string of binary bits. A digital signature is computed using a set of rules and a set of parameters that allow the identity of the signatory and the integrity of the data to be verified. Digital signatures may be generated on both stored and transmitted data.

Signature generation uses a private key to generate a digital signature; signature verification uses a public key that corresponds to, but is not the same as, the private key. Each signatory possesses a private and public key pair. Public keys may be known by the public; private keys are kept secret. Anyone can verify the signature by employing the signatory's public key. Only the user that possesses the private key can perform signature generation.

A hash function is used in the signature generation process to obtain a condensed version of the data to be signed; the condensed version of the data is often called a message digest. The message digest is input to the digital signature algorithm to generate the digital signature. The hash functions to be used are specified in the Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS 180-2. FIPS approved digital signature algorithms **shall** be used with an appropriate hash function that is specified in the SHS.

The digital signature is provided to the intended verifier along with the signed data. The verifying entity verifies the signature by using the claimed signatory's public key and the same hash function that was used to generate the signature. Similar procedures may be used to generate and verify signatures for stored as well as transmitted data.

4. Approving Authority: Secretary of Commerce.

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5. Maintenance Agency: Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory, Computer Security Division.

6. Applicability: This Standard is applicable to all Federal departments and agencies for the protection of sensitive unclassified information that is not subject to section 2315 of Title 10, United States Code, or section 3502 (2) of Title 44, United States Code. This Standard shall be used in designing and implementing public key-based signature systems that Federal departments and agencies operate or that are operated for them under contract. The adoption and use of this Standard is available to private and commercial organizations.

7. Applications: A digital signature algorithm allows an entity to authenticate the integrity of signed data and the identity of the signatory. A digital signature algorithm may also be used in proving to a third party that data was actually signed by the entity that claims to have generated the signature. A digital signature algorithm is intended for use in electronic mail, electronic funds transfer, electronic data interchange, software distribution, data storage, and other applications that require data integrity assurance and data origin authentication.

8. Implementations: A digital signature algorithm may be implemented in software, firmware, hardware or any combination thereof. NIST has developed a validation program to test implementations for conformance to the algorithms in this Standard. Information about the validation program is available at http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval.

Some of the key pairs used by digital signature algorithms in this Standard could also be used for purposes other than digital signatures (e.g., for key establishment). Agencies are advised that keys used for digital signatures **shall not** be used for any other purpose.

9. Other Approved Security Functions: Digital signature implementations that comply with this Standard **shall** employ cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key generation algorithms, and key establishment techniques that have been approved for protecting Federal government sensitive information. Approved cryptographic algorithms and techniques include those that are either:

- a. specified in a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS),
- b. adopted in a FIPS or a NIST Recommendation and specified either in an appendix to the FIPS or NIST Recommendation, or in a document referenced by the FIPS or NIST Recommendation, or
- c. specified in the list of Approved security functions for FIPS 140-2.

10. Export Control: Certain cryptographic devices and technical data regarding them are subject to Federal export controls. Exports of cryptographic modules implementing this Standard and technical data regarding them must comply with these Federal regulations and be licensed by the Bureau of Export Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Applicable Federal government export controls are specified in Title 15, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 740.17; Title 15, CFR Part 742; and Title 15, CFR Part 774, Category 5, Part 2.

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11. Patents: The algorithms in this Standard may be covered by U.S. or foreign patents.

12. Implementation Schedule: This Standard becomes effective immediately upon approval by the Secretary of Commerce. A transition strategy for validating algorithms and cryptographic modules will be posted on NISTs Web page at <u>http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/</u> under Notices. The transition plan addresses the transition by Federal agencies from modules tested and validated for compliance to FIPS 186-2 to modules tested and validated for compliance to FIPS 186-3 under the Cryptographic Module Validation Program. The transition plan allows Federal agencies and vendors to make a smooth transition to FIPS 186-3

13. Specifications: Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-3 Digital Signature Standard (affixed).

14. Cross Index: The following standards are referenced in this Standard.

- a. FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.
- b. FIPS PUB 180-2, Secure Hash Standard.
- c. ANS X9.31-1998, Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA).
- d. ANS X9.62-2005, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).
- e. ANS X9.80, Prime Number Generation, Primality Testing and Primality Certificates.
- f. Public Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #1, RSA Encryption Standard.
- g. Special Publication (SP) 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management.
- h. Special Publication (SP) 800-89, Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications.
- i. Special Publication (SP) 800-90, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators.

15. Qualifications: The security of a digital signature system is dependent on maintaining the secrecy of the signatory's private keys. Signatories **shall**, therefore, guard against the disclosure of their private keys. While it is the intent of this Standard to specify general security requirements for generating digital signatures, conformance to this Standard does not assure that a particular implementation is secure. It is the responsibility of an implementer to ensure that any module that implements a digital signature capability is designed and built in a secure manner.

Similarly, the use of a product containing an implementation that conforms to this Standard does not guarantee the security of the overall system in which the product is used. The responsible authority in each agency or department **shall** assure that an overall implementation provides an

acceptable level of security.

Since a standard of this nature must be flexible enough to adapt to advancements and innovations in science and technology, this Standard will be reviewed every five years in order to assess its adequacy.

16. Waiver Procedure: As per the Federal Information Systems Management Act of 2002, waivers to Federal Information Processing Standards are no longer allowed.

17. Where to Obtain Copies of the Standard: This publication is available by accessing <u>http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/</u>. Other computer security publications are available at the same web site.

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Specifications for the DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD (DSS)

1. Introduction

This Standard defines methods for digital signature generation that can be used for the protection of binary data (commonly called a message), and for the verification and validation of those digital signatures. Three techniques are allowed.

- (1) The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is specified in this Standard. The specification includes criteria for the generation of domain parameters, for the generation of public and private key pairs, and for the generation and verification of digital signatures.
- (2) The RSA digital signature algorithm is specified in American National Standard (ANS) X9.31 and Public Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #1. FIPS 186-3 allows implementations of either or both of these standards, but specifies additional requirements.
- (3) The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is specified in ANS X9.62. FIPS 186-3 allows ECDSA, but specifies additional requirements. Recommended elliptic curves for Federal Government use are provided herein.

This Standard includes requirements for obtaining the assurances necessary for valid digital signatures. Methods for obtaining these assurances are provided in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-89, *Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications*.

2. Glossary of Terms, Acronyms and Mathematical Symbols

2.1 Terms and Definitions

Approved	FIPS-Approved and/or NIST-recommended. An algorithm or technique that is either 1) specified in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation, or 2) adopted in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation and specified either in an appendix to the FIPS or NIST Recommendation.
Assurance of domain parameter validity	Confidence that the domain parameters are arithmetically correct.
Assurance of possession	Confidence that an entity possesses a private key and any associated keying material.
Assurance of public key validity	Confidence that the public key is arithmetically correct.
Bit string	An ordered sequence of 0's and 1's. The leftmost bit is the most significant bit of the string. The rightmost bit is the least significant bit of the string.
Certificate	A set of data that uniquely identifies a key pair and an owner that is authorized to use the key pair. The certificate contains the owner's public key and possibly other information, and is digitally signed by a Certification Authority (i.e., a trusted party), thereby binding the public key to the owner.
Certification Authority (CA)	The entity in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that is responsible for issuing certificates and exacting compliance with a PKI policy.
Claimed signatory	From the verifier's perspective, the claimed signatory is the entity that purportedly generated a digital signature.
Digital signature	The result of a cryptographic transformation of data that, when properly implemented, provides a mechanism for verifying origin authentication, data integrity and signatory non-repudiation.
Domain parameter seed	A string of bits that is used as input for a domain parameter generation and validation process.
Domain parameters	Parameters used with a cryptographic algorithm that are usually common to a domain of users.

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Entity	An individual (person), organization, device or interchangeably with "party".	process. Used
Entropy	A measure of the disorder, randomness or varial system. The entropy of X is a mathematical measure information provided by an observation of X.	-
Equivalent process	Two processes are equivalent if, when the same each process (either as input parameters or as va during the process or both), the same output is p	alues made available
Hash function	A function that maps a bit string of arbitrary len- bit string. Approved hash functions are specifie are designed to satisfy the following properties:	d in FIPS 180-2 and
	1. (One-way) It is computationally infeasibl maps to any new pre-specified output, an	• •
	2. (Collision resistant) It is computationally two distinct inputs that map to the same of	5
Hash value	See "message digest".	
Intended signatory	An entity that intends to generate digital signatu	ares in the future.
Key	A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptog determines its operation in such a way that an er of the key can reproduce the operation, while ar knowledge of the key cannot. Examples application	ntity with knowledge n entity without
	1. The computation of a digital signature fro	m data, and
	2. The verification of a digital signature.	
Key pair	A public key and its corresponding private key.	
Message	The data that is signed. Also known as "signed signature verification and validation process.	data" during the
Message digest	The result of applying a hash function to a mess "hash value".	age. Also known as
Non-repudiation	A service that is used to provide assurance of the of data in such a way that the integrity and origin validated by a third party as having originated f possession of the private key (i.e., the signatory	in can be verified and from a specific entity in
Owner	A key pair owner is the entity that is authorized of a key pair.	to use the private key

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Party	An individual (person), organization, device of interchangeably with "entity".	or process. Used
Per-message secret number	A secret random number that is generated pri- each digital signature.	or to the generation of
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)	A framework that is established to issue, main key certificates.	ntain and revoke public
Prime number generation seed	A string of random bits that is used to determ the required characteristics.	ine a prime number with
Private key	A cryptographic key that is used with an asyn cryptographic algorithm. For digital signature uniquely associated with the owner and is not private key is used to compute a digital signat using the corresponding public key.	es, the private key is t made public. The
Pseudorandom	A process or data produced by a process is sa when the outcome is deterministic, yet also et as the internal action of the process is hidden cryptographic purposes, "effectively" means intended security strength."	ffectively random as long from observation. For
Public key	A cryptographic key that is used with an asyn cryptographic algorithm and is associated wit public key is associated with an owner and m case of digital signatures, the public key is us signature that was signed using the correspon	h a private key. The ay be made public. In the ed to verify a digital
Random number generator	A device or algorithm that can produce a sequence that appears to be statistically independent an	
Security strength	A number associated with the amount of work operations) that is required to break a cryptog system. Sometimes referred to as a security le	graphic algorithm or
Shall	Used to indicate a requirement of this Standar	rd.
Should	Used to indicate a strong recommendation, but this Standard.	ut not a requirement of
Signatory	The entity that generates a digital signature of key.	n data using a private
Signature generation	The process of using a digital signature algorigenerate a digital signature on data.	ithm and a private key to

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Signature validation	The (mathematical) verification of the digital signature and obtaining the appropriate assurances (e.g., public key validity, private key possession, etc.).	
Signature verification	The process of using a digital signature algorithm and a verify a digital signature on data.	public key to
Signed data	The data or message upon which a digital signature has been computed. Also, see Message.	
Timestamp	A token or packet of information that is used to provide assurance of timeliness; contains timestamped data, including the time, and a signature generated by a Trusted Timestamp Authority (TTA).	
Trusted third party (TTP)	An entity other than the owner and verifier that is truste or the verifier or both.	ed by the owner
Trusted timestamp	A timestamp that has been signed by a Trusted Timestamp Authority.	
Trusted Timestamp Authority (TTA)	An entity that is trusted to provide timestamps with accurate time information.	
Verifier	The entity that verifies the authenticity of a digital signal public key.	ature using the
2.2 Acronyms		
ANS	American National Standard.	

	American Futional Standard.
CA	Certification Authority.
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm (specified in this Standard).
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm; specified in ANS X9.62.
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard.
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology.
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standard.
РКІ	Public Key Infrastructure.
RBG	Random Bit Generator; specified in SP 800-90.
RSA	Algorithm developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adelman (specified in ANS X9.31 and PKCS #1).
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm; specified in FIPS 180-2.
TTA	Trusted Timestamp Authority.

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TSP	Timestamp Packet.	
ТТР	Trusted Third Party.	

2.3 Mathematical Symbols


a mod n	The unique remainder r , $0 \le r \le (n-1)$, when integer a is divided by n . For example, 23 mod $7 = 2$.
$b \equiv a \mod n$	There exists an integer k such that $b - a = kn$; equivalently, $a \mod n = b \mod n$.
counter	The counter value that results from the domain parameter generation process when the domain parameter seed is used to generate DSA domain parameters.
d	The private signature exponent of an RSA private key.
domain_parameter_seed	A seed used for the generation of domain parameters.
е	The public verification exponent of an RSA public key.
g	One of the DSA domain parameters; g is a generator of the q -order cyclic group of $GF(p)^*$; that is, an element of order q in the multiplicative group of $GF(p)$.
$\mathbf{GCD}\left(a,b ight)$	Greatest common divisor of the integers <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> .
Hash (M)	The result of a hash computation (message digest or hash value) on message M using an Approved hash function.
index	A value used in the generation of g to indicate its intended use (e.g., for digital signatures).
k	For DSA and ECDSA, a per-message secret number.
L	For DSA, the length of the parameter <i>p</i> in bits.
LCM (a, b)	The least common multiple of the integers <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> .
M	The message that is signed using the digital signature algorithm.
т	For ECDSA, the degree of the finite field F_{2^m} .
Ν	For DSA, the length of the parameter q in bits.
n	1. The RSA modulus; the bit length of <i>n</i> is considered to be the key size.
	2. For ECDSA, the order of the base point of the elliptic curve; the bit length of <i>n</i> is considered to be the key size.

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nlen	The length of the RSA modulus <i>n</i> .	
p	1. One of the DSA domain parameters; a print the Galois Field GF(<i>p</i>) and is used as a m of GF(<i>p</i>).	
	2. A prime factor of the RSA modulus <i>n</i> .	
q	1. One of the DSA domain parameters; a pri	me factor of $p - 1$.
	2. A prime factor of the RSA modulus <i>n</i> .	
r	One component of a DSA digital signature.	
S	One component of a DSA digital signature.	
S	The security strength.	
seedlen	The length of the seed for the <i>domain_parameter_seed</i> .	
SHA <i>x</i> (<i>M</i>)	The result when M is the input to the SHA- x hash function, where SHA- x is specified in FIPS 180-2.	
x	The DSA private key.	
у	The DSA public key.	
\oplus	Bitwise logical "exclusive-or" on bit strings corresponding bits of each bit string, the rest follows: $0 \oplus 0 = 0, 0 \oplus 1 = 1, 1 \oplus 0 = 1$, or	ult is determined as
	Example: $01101 \oplus 11010 = 10111$	
V	Inclusive-or on bit strings of the same length of each bit string, the result is determined as = 1, $1 \lor 0 = 1$, and $1 \lor 1 = 1$.	· · · ·
	Example: $01100 \lor 11010 = 11110$.	
+	Addition.	
*	Multiplication.	
÷	Integer division.	
$a \parallel b$	The concatenation of two strings <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> . Eistrings, or both are octet strings.	ther a and b are both bit
$\lceil a \rceil$	The ceiling of <i>a</i> : the smallest integer that is <i>a</i> . For example, $\lceil 5 \rceil = 5$, $\lceil 5.3 \rceil = 6$, and $\lceil -2.5 \rceil = 6$.	
len (<i>a</i>)	The length of <i>a</i> in bits.	

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<i> a</i>	Absolute value of <i>a</i> ; $ a $ is - <i>a</i> if $a < 0$; otherwise, it is simply <i>a</i> . For example, $ 2 = 2$, and $ -2 = 2$.	
[<i>a</i> , <i>b</i>]	The interval of integers between and including <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> . For example, [1, 4] consists of the integers 1, 2, 3 and 4.	
$\{, a, b,\}$	Used to indicate optional information.	
(r, s)	A DSA or ECDSA digital signature, where <i>r</i> and <i>s</i> are the digital signature components.	

3. General Discussion

A digital signature is an electronic analogue of a written signature; the digital signature can be used to provide assurance that the claimed signatory signed the information. In addition, a digital signature may be used to detect whether or not the information was modified after it was signed (i.e., to detect the integrity of the signed data). These assurances may be obtained whether the data was received in a transmission or retrieved from storage. A properly implemented digital signature algorithm that meets the requirements of this Standard can provide these services.



A digital signature algorithm includes a digital signature generation process and a signature verification process. A signatory uses the generation process to generate a digital signature on data; a verifier uses the verification process to verify the authenticity of the signature. Each signatory has a public and private key and is the owner of that key pair. As shown in Figure 1, the private key is used in the signature generation process. The key pair owner is the only entity that is authorized to use the private key to generate digital signatures. In order to prevent other entities from claiming to be the key pair owner and using the private key to generate fraudulent signatures, the private key must remain secret, i.e., the private key must be known only by the key pair owner. The Approved digital signature algorithms are designed to prevent an adversary who does not know the signatory's private key from generating the same signature as the signatory on a different message. In other words, signatures are designed so that they cannot be

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forged. A number of alternative terms are used in this Standard to refer to the signatory or key pair owner. An entity that intends to generate digital signatures in the future may be referred to as the *intended signatory*. Prior to the verification of a signed message, the signatory is referred to as the *claimed signatory* until such time as adequate assurance can be obtained of the actual identity of the signatory.

The public key is used in the signature verification process (see Figure 1). The public key need not be kept secret, but its integrity must be maintained. Anyone can verify a correctly signed message using the public key.

For both the signature generation and verification processes, the message (i.e., the signed data), is compressed by means of an Approved hash function. Both the uncompressed message and the digital signature are made available to a verifier.

A verifier requires assurance that the public key to be used to verify a signature belongs to the entity that claims to have generated a digital signature (i.e., the claimed signatory). That is, a verifier requires assurance that the signatory is the actual owner of the public/private key pair used to generate and verify a digital signature. A binding of an owner's identity and the owner's public key **shall** be effected in order to provide this assurance.

A verifier also requires assurance that the key pair owner actually possesses the associated private key, and that the public key is a mathematically correct key.

By obtaining these assurances, the verifier has assurance that if the digital signature can be correctly verified using the public key, the digital signature is valid (i.e., the key pair owner really signed the message). Digital signature validation includes both the (mathematical) verification of the digital signature and obtaining the appropriate assurances. The following are reasons why such assurances are required.

- 1. If a verifier does not obtain assurance that a signatory is the actual owner of the key pair whose public component is used to verify a signature, the problem of forging a signature is reduced to the problem of falsely claiming an identity. For example, anyone in possession of a mathematically consistent key pair can sign a message and claim that the signatory was the President of the United States. If a verifier doesn't require assurance that the President is actually the owner of the public key that is used to mathematically verify the message's signature, then successful signature verification provides assurance that the message has not been altered since it was signed, but does not provide assurance that the message came from the President. (The verifier has assurance of the data's integrity, but source authentication is lacking.)
- 2. If the public key used to verify a signature is not mathematically valid, the arguments used to establish the cryptographic strength of the signature algorithm may not apply. The owner may not be the only party who can generate signatures that can be verified with that public key.
- 3. If a public key infrastructure cannot provide assurance to a verifier that the owner of a

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key pair has demonstrated knowledge of a private key that corresponds to the owner's public key, then it may be possible for an unscrupulous entity to have their identity (or an assumed identity) bound to a public key that is (or has been) used by another party. The unscrupulous entity may then claim to be the source of certain messages signed by that other party. Or, it may be possible that an unscrupulous party has managed to obtain ownership of a public key that was chosen with the sole purpose of allowing for the verification of a signature on a specific message.

Technically, a key pair used by a digital signature algorithm could also be used for purposes other than digital signatures (e.g., for key establishment). However, a key pair used for digital signature generation and verification **shall not** be used for any other purpose. See SP 800-57 on Key Usage for further information.

A number of steps are required to enable a digital signature generation or verification capability in accordance with this Standard. All parties that generate digital signatures **shall** perform the initial setup process as discussed in Section 3.1. Digital signature generation **shall** be performed as discussed in Section 3.2. Digital signature verification and validation **shall** be performed as discussed in Section 3.3.

3.1 Initial Setup

Figure 2 depicts the steps that **shall** be performed prior to generating a digital signature by an entity intending to act as a signatory.

For the DSA and ECDSA algorithms, the intended signatory **shall** first obtain appropriate domain parameters, either by generating the domain parameters itself, or by obtaining domain parameters that another entity has generated. Having obtained the set of domain parameters, the intended signatory **shall** obtain assurance of




Figure 2: Initial Setup by an Intended Signatory

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the validity of those domain parameters; approved methods for obtaining this assurance are provided in SP 800-89. Note that the RSA algorithm does not use domain parameters.

Each intended signatory **shall** obtain a digital signature key pair that is generated as specified for the appropriate digital signature algorithm, either by generating the key pair itself or by obtaining the key pair from a trusted party. The intended signatory is authorized to use the key pair and is the owner of that key pair. Note that if a trusted party generates the key pair, that party needs to be trusted not to masquerade as the owner, even though the trusted party knows the private key.

After obtaining the key pair, the intended signatory (now the key pair owner) **shall** obtain (1) assurance of the validity of the public key and (2) assurance that he/she actually possesses the associated private key. Approved methods for obtaining these assurances are provided in SP 800-89.

A digital signature verifier requires assurance of the identity of the signatory. Depending on the environment in which digital signatures are generated and verified, the key pair owner (i.e., the intended signatory) may register the public key and establish proof of identity with a mutually trusted party. For example, a certification authority (CA) could sign credentials containing an owner's public key and identity to form a certificate after being provided with proof of the owner's identity. Systems for certifying credentials and distributing certificates are beyond the scope of this Standard. Other means of establishing proof of identity (e.g., by providing identity credentials along with the public key directly to a prospective verifier) are allowed.

3.2 Digital Signature Generation

Figure 3 depicts the steps that **shall** be performed by an intended signatory (i.e., the entity that generates a digital signature).

Prior to the generation of a digital signature, a message digest **shall** be generated on the information to be signed using an appropriate Approved hash function.

Depending on the digital signature algorithm to be used, additional information **shall** be obtained. For example, a random per-message secret number **shall** be obtained for DSA and ECDSA.

Using the selected digital signature algorithm, the signature private key, the message digest, and any other information required by the digital signature process, a digital signature **shall** be




Figure 3: Digital Signature Generation

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generated in accordance with this Standard.

The signatory **may** optionally verify the digital signature using the signature verification process. This may be prudent for a high-value message, when multiple users are expected to verify the signature, or if the verifier will be verifying the signature at a much later time.

3.3 Digital Signature Verification and Validation

Figure 4 depicts the digital signature verification and validation process that **shall** be performed by a verifier (e.g., the intended recipient of the signed data and associated digital signature).




Figure 4: Digital Signature Verification and Validation

In order to verify a digital signature, the verifier **shall** obtain the public key of the claimed signatory, (usually) based on the claimed identity. If DSA or ECDSA has been used to generate the digital signature, the verifier **shall** also obtain the domain parameters. The public key and domain parameters **may** be obtained, for example, from a certificate created by a trusted party (e.g., a CA) or directly from the claimed signatory. A message digest **shall** be generated on the

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data whose signature is to be verified (i.e., not on the received digital signature) using the same hash function that was used during the digital signature generation process. Using the appropriate digital signature algorithm, the domain parameters (if appropriate), the public key and the newly computed message digest, the received digital signature is verified in accordance with this Standard. If the verification process fails, no inference can be made as to whether the data is correct, only that the signature is incorrect for that data.

Before accepting the verified digital signature as valid, the verifier **shall** have (1) assurance of the signatory's claimed identity, (2) assurance of the validity of the domain parameters (for DSA and ECDSA), (3) assurance of the validity of the public key, and (4) assurance that the claimed signatory actually possessed the private key that was used to generate the digital signature at the time that the signature was generated. Methods for the verifier to obtain these assurances are provided in SP 800-89. Note that assurance of domain parameter validity may have been obtained during initial setup (see Section 3.1).

If the verification and assurance processes are successful, the digital signature and signed data **shall** be considered valid. However, if a verification or assurance process fails, the digital signature **should** be considered invalid. An organization's policy **shall** govern the action to be taken for an invalid digital signature. Such policy is outside the scope of this Standard.

4 The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

4.1 DSA Parameters

A DSA digital signature is computed using a set of domain parameters, a private key x, a permessage secret number k, data to be signed, and a hash function. A digital signature is verified using the same domain parameters, a public key y that is mathematically associated with the private key used to generate the digital signature, data to be verified, and the same hash function that was used during signature generation. These parameters are defined as follows:

- *p* a prime modulus, where $2^{L-1} , and$ *L*is the bit length of*p*. Values for*L*are provided in Section 4.2.
- *q* a prime divisor of (p 1), where $2^{N-1} < q < 2^{N}$, and *N* is the bit length of *q*. Values for *N* are provided in Section 4.2.
- g a generator of the subgroup of order $q \mod p$, such that $1 \le q \le q$.
- x the private key that must remain secret; x is a randomly or pseudorandomly generated integer, such that 0 < x < q, i.e., x is in the range [1, q-1].
- y the public key, where $y = g^x \mod p$.
- k a secret number that is unique to each message; k is a randomly or pseudorandomly generated integer, such that 0 < k < q, i.e., k is in the range [1, q-1].

4.2 Selection of Parameter Sizes and Hash Functions for DSA

This Standard specifies the following choices for the pair L and N (the bit lengths of p and q, respectively):

L = 1024, N = 160 L = 2048, N = 224 L = 2048, N = 256L = 3072, N = 256

Federal Government entities shall use one or more of these choices.

A hash function is required during the generation of digital signatures. The hash functions are specified in FIPS 180-2. The security strength of the hash function used **shall** meet or exceed the security strength of the (L, N) pair. The security strength for each (L, N) pair and hash function is provided in SP 800-57. It is recommended that the security strength of the (L, N) pair and the hash function be the same unless an agreement has been made between participating entities to use a stronger hash function; a hash function that provides a lower security strength than the (L, N) pair **shall not** be used. If the output of the hash function is greater than N (i.e., the bit length

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of q), then the leftmost N bits of the hash function output block **shall** be used in any calculation using the hash function output during the generation or verification of a digital signature.

Special Publication (SP) 800-57 provides information about the selection of the appropriate (L, N) pair in accordance with a desired security strength for a given time period. An (L, N) pair **shall** be chosen that protects the signed information during the entire expected lifetime of that information. For example, if a digital signature is generated in 2008 for information that needs to be protected for five years, and a particular (L, N) pair is invalid after 2010, then a larger (L, N) pair **shall** be used that remains valid for the entire period of time that the information needs to be protected.

A Federal Government entity other than a Certification Authority (CA) **should** use only the first three (L, N) pairs (i.e., the (1024, 160), (2048, 224) and (2048, 256) pairs). A CA **shall** use an (L, N) pair that is equal to or greater than the (L, N) pairs used by its subscribers. For example, if subscribers are using the (2048, 224) pair, then the CA **shall** use either the (2048, 224), (2048, 256) or (3072, 256) pair. Possible exceptions to this rule include cross certification between CAs, certifying keys for purposes other than digital signatures and transitioning from one key size or algorithm to another. See SP 800-57 for further guidance.

4.3 DSA Domain Parameters

DSA requires that the private/public key pairs used for digital signature generation and verification be generated with respect to a particular set of domain parameters. These domain parameters may be common to a group of users and may be public. A user of a set of domain parameters (i.e., both the signatory and the verifier) **shall** have assurance of their validity prior to using them (see Section 3). Although domain parameters may be public information, they **shall** be managed so that the correct correspondence between a given key pair and its set of domain parameters is maintained for all parties that use the key pair. A set of domain parameters **may** remain fixed for an extended time period.

The domain parameters for DSA are the integers p, q, and g, and optionally, the *domain_parameter_seed* and *counter* that were used to generate p and q (i.e., the full set of domain parameters is $(p, q, g \{, domain_parameter_seed, counter\})$).

4.3.1 Domain Parameter Generation

Domain parameters may be generated by a trusted third party (a TTP, such as a CA) or by an entity other than a TTP. Assurance of domain parameter validity **shall** be obtained prior to key pair generation, digital signature generation or digital signature verification (see Section 3).

The integers p and q **shall** be generated as specified in Appendix A.1. The input to the generation process is the selected values of L and N (see Section 4.2); the output of the generation process is the values for p and q, and optionally, the values of the *domain_parameter_seed* and *counter*.

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The generator g shall be generated as specified in Appendix A.2.

4.3.2 Domain Parameter Management

Each digital signature key pair **shall** be correctly associated with one specific set of domain parameters (e.g., by a public key certificate that identifies the domain parameters associated with the public key). The domain parameters **shall** be protected from unauthorized modification until the set is deactivated (if and when the set is no longer needed). The same domain parameters **may** be used for more than one purpose (e.g., the same domain parameters may be used for both digital signatures and key establishment).

4.4 Key Pairs

Each signatory has a key pair: a private key x and a public key y that are mathematically related to each other. The private key **shall** be used for only a fixed period of time (i.e., the private key cryptoperiod) in which digital signatures **may** be generated; the public key **may** continue to be used as long as digital signatures generated using the associated private key need to be verified (i.e., the public key **may** continue to be used beyond the cryptoperiod of the associated private key). See SP 800-57 for further guidance.

4.4.1 DSA Key Pair Generation

A digital signature key pair x and y is generated for a set of domain parameters $(p, q, g \{, domain_parameter_seed, counter\})$. Methods for the generation of x and y are provided in Appendix B.1.

4.4.2 Key Pair Management

Guidance on the protection of key pairs is provided in SP 800-57. The secure use of digital signatures depends on the management of an entity's digital signature key pair as follows:

- 1. The validity of the domain parameters **shall** be assured prior to the generation of the key pair, or the verification and validation of a digital signature (see Section 3).
- 2. Each key pair **shall** be associated with the domain parameters under which the key pair was generated.
- 3. Key pairs **shall** only be used to generate and verify signatures using their associated domain parameters.
- 4. The private key **shall** be used only for signature generation and **shall** be kept secret; the public key **shall** be used only for signature verification and **may** be made public.
- 5. An intended signatory **shall** have assurance of possession of the private key prior to or concurrently with using it to generate a digital signature (see Section 3.1).

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- 6. A private key shall be protected from unauthorized access, disclosure and modification.
- 7. A public key **shall** be protected from unauthorized modification (including substitution). For example, public key certificates that are signed by a CA **may** provide such protection.
- 8. A verifier **shall** be assured of a binding between the public key, its associated domain parameters and the key pair owner (see Section 3).
- 9. A verifier **shall** obtain public keys in a trusted manner (e.g., from a certificate signed by a CA that the entity trusts, or directly from the intended or claimed signatory, provided that the entity is trusted by the verifier and can be authenticated as the source of the signed information that is to be verified).
- 10. Verifiers **shall** be assured that the claimed signatory is the key pair owner, and that the owner possessed the private key that was used to generate the digital signature at the time that the signature was generated (i.e., the private key that is associated with the public key that will be used to verify the digital signature) (see Section 3.3).
- 11. A signatory and a verifier **shall** have assurance of the validity of the public key (see Sections 3.1 and 3.3).

4.5 DSA Per-Message Secret Number

A new secret random number k shall be generated prior to the generation of each digital signature for use during the signature generation process. This secret number shall be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

 k^{-1} is the multiplicative inverse of k with respect to multiplication modulo q; i.e., $0 < k^{-1} < q$ and $1 = (k^{-1} k) \mod q$. This inverse is required for the signature generation process (see Section 4.6). A technique is provided in Appendix D.1 for deriving k^{-1} from k.

k and k^{-1} may be pre-computed, since knowledge of the message to be signed is not required for the computations.

Methods for the generation of the per-message secret number are provided in Appendix B.2.

4.6 DSA Signature Generation

The intended signatory shall have assurances as specified in Section 3.1.

Let N be the bit length of q. The signature of a message M consists of the pair of numbers r and s that is computed according to the following equations:

 $r = (g^k \mod p) \mod q.$

z = the leftmost *N* bits of **Hash**(*M*).

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 $s = (k^{-1}(z + xr)) \mod q.$

When computing s, the string resulting from **Hash**(M) **shall** be converted to an integer. The conversion rule is provided in Appendix D.2.

The values of *r* and *s* shall be checked to determine if r = 0 or s = 0. If either r = 0 or s = 0, a new value of *k* shall be generated, and the signature shall be recalculated. It is extremely unlikely that r = 0 or s = 0 if signatures are generated properly.

The signature (r, s) may be transmitted along with the message to the verifier.

Note that the value of r may be pre-computed along with the values of k and k^{-1} , since knowledge of the message to be signed is not required for the computation of r.

4.7 DSA Signature Verification and Validation

Signature verification may be performed by any party (i.e., the signatory, the intended recipient or any other party) using the signatory's public key. A signatory may wish to verify that the computed signature is correct, perhaps before sending the signed message to the intended recipient. The intended recipient (or any other party) verifies the signature to determine its authenticity.

Prior to verifying the signature of a signed message, the domain parameters, and the claimed signatory's public key and identity **shall** be made available to the verifier in an authenticated manner. The public key may, for example, be obtained in the form of a certificate signed by a trusted entity (e.g., a CA) or in a face-to-face meeting with the public key owner.

Let M', r', and s' be the received versions of M, r, and s, respectively; let y be the public key of the claimed signatory; and let N be the bit length of q. The signature verification process is as follows:

- 1. The verifier shall check that 0 < r' < q and 0 < s' < q; if either condition is violated, the signature shall be rejected as invalid.
- 2. If the two conditions in step 1 are satisfied, the verifier computes the following:
 - $w = (s')^{-1} \bmod q.$

z = the leftmost *N* bits of **Hash**(*M'*).

 $u1 = (zw) \mod q.$

$$u2 = ((r')w) \bmod q.$$

 $v = (((g)^{u_1} (y)^{u_2}) \mod p) \mod q.$

A technique is provided in Appendix D.1 for deriving $(s')^{-1}$ (i.e., the multiplicative inverse of $s' \mod q$)

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- 3. If v = r', then the signature is verified. For a proof that v = r' when M' = M, r' = r, and s' = s, see Appendix F.
- 4. If v does not equal r', then the message or the signature may have been modified, there may have been an error in the signatory's generation process, or an imposter (who did not know the private key associated with the public key of the claimed signatory) may have attempted to forge the signature. The signature **shall** be considered invalid. No inference can be made as to whether the data is valid, only that the signature is incorrect for that data.
- 5. Prior to accepting the signature as valid, the verifier **shall** have assurances as specified in Section 3.3.

An organization's policy may govern the action to be taken for invalid digital signatures. Such policy is outside the scope of this Standard. Appendix C provides discussions about determining the timeliness of digitally signed messages.

5. The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm

The use of the RSA algorithm for digital signature generation and verification is specified in ANS X9.31 and PKCS #1. While each of these standards uses the RSA algorithm, the format of the ANS X9.31 and PKCS #1 data on which the digital signature is generated differs in details that make them non-interchangeable.

5.1 RSA Key Pair Generation

An RSA key pair consists of an RSA private key, which is used to compute a digital signature, and an RSA public key, which is used to verify a digital signature. An RSA key pair used for digital signatures **shall** only be used for digital signatures, not for other purposes (e.g., key establishment).

An RSA public key consists of a modulus n, which is the product of two positive prime integers p and q (i.e., n = pq), and a public key exponent e. Thus, the RSA public key is the pair of values (n, e) and is used to verify digital signatures. The size of an RSA key pair is commonly considered to be the length of the modulus n in bits (*nlen*).

The corresponding RSA private key consists of the same modulus n and a private key exponent d that depends on n and the public key exponent e. Thus, the RSA private key is the pair of values (n, d) and is used to generate digital signatures. Note that an alternative method for representing (n, d) using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is allowed as specified in PKCS #1.

In order to provide security for the digital signature process, the two integers p and q, and the private key exponent d shall be kept secret. The modulus n and the public key exponent e may be made known to anyone. Guidance on the protection of these values is provided in SP 800-57.

This Standard specifies three choices for the length of the modulus (i.e., *nlen*): 1024, 2048 and 3072 bits. Federal Government entities **shall** use one or more of these choices.

An Approved hash function, as specified in FIPS 180-2, **shall** be used during the generation of digital signatures. The security strength of the hash function used **shall** meet or exceed the security strength associated with the bit length of the modulus *n*. The security strength for each modulus length and hash function is provided in SP 800-57. It is recommended that the security strength of the modulus and the hash function be the same unless an agreement has been made between participating entities to use a stronger hash function; a hash function that provides a lower security strength than the modulus **shall not** be used.

Federal Government entities other than CAs **should** use only the first two choices during the timeframes indicated in SP 800-57 (i.e., where nlen = 1024 or 2048). A CA **should** use a modulus whose length *nlen* is equal to or greater than the moduli used by its subscribers. For example, if the subscribers are using an nlen = 2048, then the CA **should** use $nlen \ge 2048$. SP 800-57 provides further information about the selection of the bit length of *n*. Possible exceptions to this rule include cross certification between CAs, certifying keys for purposes

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other than digital signatures and transitioning from one key size or algorithm to another.

RSA keys **shall** be generated with respect to a security strength *S*. Criteria for the generation of RSA key pairs are provided in Appendix B.3.1.

When RSA parameters are randomly generated (i.e., the primes p and q, and optionally, the public key exponent e), they **shall** be generated using an Approved random or pseudorandom number generator (see SP 800-90). The resulting (pseudo) random numbers **shall** be used as seeds for generating RSA parameters (i.e., the (pseudo) random number is used as a prime number generation seed). Prime number generation seeds **shall** be kept secret or destroyed when the modulus n is computed. If the prime number generation seeds are retained, they **shall** only be used as evidence that the generated values (i.e., p, q or e) were determined in an arbitrary manner and **shall** be protected in a manner that is (at least) equivalent to the protection required for the private key.

5.2 Key Pair Management

The secure use of digital signatures depends on the management of an entity's digital signature key pair. Key pair management requirements for RSA are provided in Section 4.4.2, requirements 4 - 11. Note that the first three requirements in Section 4.4.2, which address the relationship between domain parameters and key pairs, are not appropriate for RSA.

5.3 Assurances

The intended signatory **shall** have assurances as specified in Section 3.1. Prior to accepting a digital signature as valid, the verifier **shall** have assurances as specified in Section 3.3.

5.4 ANS X9.31

ANS X9.31, *Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA)*, was developed for the American National Standards Institute by the Accredited Standards Committee on Financial Services, X9. Information about obtaining copies of ANS X9.31 is available at <u>http://www.x9.org</u>. An errata sheet for ANS X9.31 is also available. The following discussions are based on the version of ANS X9.31 that was approved in 1998.

A method for the generation of the private prime factors p and q is provided in Appendix B.3.2, based on the method used in ANS X9.31. The criteria for RSA key generation in ANS X9.31 are consistent with the criteria in Appendix B.3.1.

In ANS X9.31, the length of the modulus n is allowed in increments of 256 bits beyond a minimum of 1024 bits. Implementations claiming conformance to FIPS 186-3 **shall** include one or more of the modulus sizes specified in Section 5.1.

Two methods for the generation of digital signatures are included in ANS X9.31. When the

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public signature verification exponent e is odd, the digital signature algorithm is commonly known as RSA; when the public signature verification exponent e is even, the digital signature algorithm is commonly known as Rabin-Williams. This Standard (i.e., FIPS 186-3) adopts the use of RSA, but does not adopt the use of Rabin-Williams.

ANS X9.31 contains an annex on random number generation. However, implementations of ANS X9.31 **shall** use the Approved random number generation methods specified in SP 800-90.

Annexes in ANS X9.31 provide informative discussions of security and implementation considerations.

5.5 PKCS #1

Public-Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #1, *RSA Cryptography Standard*, defines mechanisms for encrypting and signing data using the RSA algorithm. PKCS #1 v2.1 specifies two digital signature processes and corresponding formats: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 and RSASSA-PSS. Both signature schemes are Approved for use, but additional constraints are imposed beyond those specified in PKCS #1 v2.1.

- (a) Implementations that generate RSA key pairs **shall** use the criteria in Appendix B.3.1 and the method in B.3.2 to generate those key pairs,
- (b) Only Approved hash functions shall be used.
- (c) Only two prime factors *p* and *q* shall be used to form the modulus *n*.
- (d) Random numbers shall be generated in accordance with SP 800-90.
- (e) For RSASSA-PSS, the length of the salt (*sLen*) shall be: $0 \le sLen \le$ the length of the hash function output block.

Note: PKCS #1 was initially developed by RSA Laboratories in 1991 and has been revised as multiple versions. At the time of the approval of FIPS 186-3, three versions of PKSC #1 were available: version 1.5, version 2.0 and version 2.1. This Standard references only version 2.1.

6. The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)

ANS X9.62, *Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Standard (ECDSA)*, was developed for the American National Standards Institute by the Accredited Standards Committee on Financial Services, X9. Information about obtaining copies of ANS X9.62 are available at <u>http://www.x9.org</u>. The following discussions are based on the version of ANS X9.62 that was approved in 2005. When available, the most current version of ANS X9.62 **shall** be used, subject to the transition period discussed in the implementation schedule of this Standard.

ANS X9.62 defines methods for digital signature generation and verification using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). Specifications for the generation of the domain parameters used during the generation and verification of digital signatures are also included in ANS X9.62. ECDSA is the elliptic curve analog of DSA. ECDSA keys **shall not** be used for any other purpose (e.g., key establishment).

6.1 ECDSA Domain Parameters

ECDSA requires that the private/public key pairs used for digital signature generation and verification be generated with respect to a particular set of domain parameters. These domain parameters may be common to a group of users and may be public. Domain parameters may remain fixed for an extended time period.

Domain parameters for ECDSA are of the form (q, FR, a, b, {domain_parameter_seed}, G, n, h), where q is the field size; FR is an indication of the basis used; a and b are two field elements that define the equation of the curve; domain_parameter_seed is the domain parameter seed and is an optional bit string that is present if the elliptic curve was randomly generated in a verifiable fashion; G is a generating point, (x_G, y_G) of prime order on the curve; n is the order of the point G; and h is the cofactor (which is equal to the order of the curve divided by n).

6.1.1 Domain Parameter Generation

This Standard specifies five ranges for n (see Table 1). For each range, a maximum cofactor size is also specified. Note that the specification of a cofactor h in a set of domain parameters is optional in ANS X9.62, whereas implementations conforming to this Standard (i.e., FIPS 186-3) **shall** specify the cofactor h in the set of domain parameters. ANS X9.62 has no restriction on the maximum size of the cofactor h, whereas this Standard (i.e., FIPS 186-3) provides the maximum sizes in Table 1.

Bit length of <i>n</i>	Maximum
-	Cofactor (h)

$\log_2 n$	
161 - 223	2^{10}
224 - 255	2 ¹⁴
256 - 383	2^{16}

 2^{24}

 2^{32}

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ECDSA is defined for two arithmetic fields: the finite field F_p and the finite field F_{2^m} . For the field F_p , p is required to be an odd prime.

Specifications for the generation of ECDSA domain parameters are provided in ANS X9.62. Alternatively, NIST Recommended curves are provided in Appendix E of this Standard (i.e., FIPS 186-3). Three types of curves are provided:

1. Curves over prime fields, which are identified as P-xxx,

384 - 511

 ≥ 512

- 2. Curves over Binary fields, which are identified as B-xxx, and
- 3. Koblitz curves, which are identified as K-xxx,

where xxx indicates the bit length of *n*.

An Approved hash function, as specified in FIPS 180-2, is required during the generation of digital signatures. The security strength of the hash function used shall meet or exceed the security strength associated with the bit length of n. The security strengths for the ranges of n and the hash functions are provided in SP 800-57. It is recommended that the security strength associated with the bit length of *n* and the hash function be the same unless an agreement has been made between participating entities to use a stronger hash function; a hash function that provides a lower security strength than is associated with the bit length of *n* shall not be used. If the output of the hash function is greater than the bit length of n, then the leftmost n bits of the hash function output block shall be used in any calculation using the hash function output during the generation or verification of a digital signature.

Normally, a CA should use a bit length of *n* that is equal to or greater than any bit length of *n* used by its subscribers. For example, if subscribers are using a bit length of $n \le 224$, then CAs **should** use a bit length of $n \ge 224$. SP 800-57 provides further information about the selection of a bit length of n. Possible exceptions to this rule include cross certification between CAs, certifying keys for purposes other than digital signatures and transitioning from one key size or algorithm to another. However, these exceptions require further analysis.

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6.1.2 Domain Parameter Management

The management of ECDSA domain parameters is discussed in Section 4.3.2.

6.2 Private/Public Keys

An ECDSA key pair consists of a private key d and a public key Q that is associated with a specific set of ECDSA domain parameters and are mathematically related to each other. The private key is normally used for a period of time (i.e., the cryptoperiod); the public key may continue to be used as long as digital signatures generated using the associated private key need to be verified (i.e., the public key may continue to be used beyond the cryptoperiod of the associated private key). See SP 800-57 for further guidance.

6.2.1 Key Pair Generation

A digital signature key pair d and Q is generated for a set of domain parameters (q, FR, a, b, {domain_parameter_seed}, G, n, h). Methods for the generation of d and Q are provided in Appendix B.4.

6.2.2 Key Pair Management

The secure use of digital signatures depends on the management of an entity's digital signature key pair as specified in Section 4.4.2.

6.3 Secret Number Generation

A new secret random number k shall be generated prior to the generation of each digital signature for use during the signature generation process. This secret number shall be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification. Methods for the generation of the per-message secret number are provided in Appendix B.5.

 k^{-1} is the multiplicative inverse of k with respect multiplication modulo q; i.e., $0 < k^{-1} < q$ and $1 = (k^{-1} k) \mod q$. This inverse is required for the signature generation process. A technique is provided in Appendix D.1 for deriving k^{-1} from k.

k and k^{-1} may be pre-computed, since knowledge of the message to be signed is not required for computation.

6.4 ECDSA Digital Signature Generation and Verification

An ECDSA digital signature (r, s) shall be generated as specified in ANS X9.62, using:

- 1. Domain parameters that are generated in accordance with Section 6.1.1,
- 2. A private key that is generated as specified in Section 6.2,

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- 3. A per-message secret number that is generated as specified in Section 6.3,
- 4. An Approved hash function as specified in Section 6.1.1, and
- 5. An Approved random number generator as specified in SP 800-90.

An ECDSA digital signature **shall** be verified as specified in ANS X9.62, using the same domain parameters and hash function that was used during signature generation.

6.5 Assurances

The intended signatory **shall** have assurances as specified in Section 3.1. Prior to accepting a signature as valid, the verifier **shall** have assurances as specified in Section 3.3.

APPENDIX A: Generation and Validation of FFC Domain Parameters

Finite field cryptography (FFC) is a method of implementing discrete logarithm cryptography using finite field mathematics. DSA, as specified in this Standard, is an example of FFC. The Diffie-Hellman and MQV key establishment algorithms can also be implemented as FFC.

The domain parameters for FFC consist of the set of values $(p, q, g \{, domain_parameter_seed, counter\}$). This appendix specifies techniques for the generation of the FFC domain parameters p, q and g and performing an explicit domain parameter validation. During the generation process, the values for *domain_parameter_seed* and *counter* are obtained.

A.1 Generation of the FFC Primes *p* and *q*

This section provides methods for generating the primes p and q that fulfill the criteria specified in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. One of these methods **shall** be used when generating these primes. A method is provided in Appendix A.1.1 to generate random candidate integers and then test them for primality using a probabilistic algorithm. A second method is provided in Appendix A.1.2 that constructs integers from smaller integers so that the constructed integer is guaranteed to be prime.

During the generation, validation and testing processes, conversions between bit strings and integers are required. Appendix D.2 provides methods for these conversions.

A.1.1 Generation and Validation of Probable Primes

Previous versions of this Standard contained a method for the generation of the domain parameters p and q using SHA-1 and probabilistic methods. This method is no longer approved; however, the validation process for this generation method is provided in Appendix A.1.1.1 to validate previously generated domain parameters.

A method for the generation and validation of the primes p and q using probabilistic methods is provided in Appendix A.1.1.2 and is based on the use of an Approved hash function; this method **shall** be used for generating probable primes. The validation process for this method is provided in Appendix A.1.1.3.

The probabilistic methods use a hash function and an arbitrary seed (*domain_parameter_seed*). Arbitrary seeds could be anything, e.g., a user's favorite number or a random or pseudorandom number output by a random number generator (see SP 800-90). The *domain_parameter_seed* determines a sequence of candidates for *p* and *q* in the required intervals that are then tested for primality using a probabilistic primality test (see Appendix A.1.1.4). The test determines that the candidate is either not a prime (i.e., it is a composite integer) or is "probably a prime" (i.e., there is a very small probability that a composite integer will be declared to be a prime). *p* and *q* **shall** be the first candidate set that passes the primality tests. Note that the *domain_parameter_seed* **shall** be unique for every unique set of domain parameters that are generated using the same

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method.

A.1.1.1 Validation of the Probable Primes *p* and *q* that were Generated Using SHA-1

This prime validation algorithm is used to validate that the primes *p* and *q* were generated by the prime generation algorithm specified in previous versions of this Standard. The algorithm requires the values of *p*, *q*, *domain_parameter_seed* and *counter*, which were output from the prime generation algorithm.

Let **SHA1** () be the SHA-1 hash function specified in FIPS 180-2. The following process or its equivalent **shall** be used to validate p and q for this method.

Input:

1.	<i>p</i> , <i>q</i>	The generated primes p and q .
3.	domain_parameter_seed	A seed that was used to generate p and q .
4.	counter	A count value that was determined during generation.
Outpu	t:	
1.	status	The status returned from the validation procedure, where

status is either VALID or INVALID.

Process:

- 1. If (len $(p) \neq 1024$) or (len $(p) \neq 160$), then return INVALID.
- 2. If (counter > 4095), then return INVALID.
- 3. *seedlen* = **len** (*domain_parameter_seed*).
- 4. If (seedlen < 160), then return **INVALID.**
- 5. computed q =**SHA1**(domain_parameter_seed) \oplus **SHA1**((domain_parameter_seed + 1) mod 2^{seedlen}).
- 6. Set the first and last bits of *computed_q* equal to 1 (i.e., the 159^{th} and 0^{th} bits).
- 7. Use a robust primality testing algorithm to test whether *computed_q* is prime. See Appendix A.1.1.4. If (*computed_q* \neq q) or (*computed_q* is not prime), then return **INVALID.**
- 8. offset = 2.
- 9. For i = 0 to *counter* do
 - 9.1 For j = 0 to 6 do

 $V_j =$ **SHA1**((*domain_parameter_seed* + *offset* + *j*) mod 2^{*seedlen*}).

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- 9.2 $W = V_0 + (V_1 * 2^{160}) + (V_2 * 2^{320}) + (V_3 * 2^{480}) + (V_4 * 2^{640}) + (V_5 * 2^{800}) + ((V_6 \mod 2^{63}) * 2^{960}).$
- 9.3 $X = W + 2^{1023}$. Comment: $0 \le W < 2^{L-1}$.
- 9.4 $c = X \mod 2q$.
- 9.5 $computed_p = X \cdot (c 1)$. Comment: $computed_p \equiv 1 \mod 2q$.
- 9.6 If (*computed_p* < 2^{1023}), then go to step 9.8.
- 9.7 Use a robust primality testing algorithm to test whether *computed_p* is prime. See Appendix A.1.1.4. If *computed_p* is determined to be prime, then go to step 10.
- 9.8 offset = offset + 7.
- 10. If $((i \neq counter)$ or $(computed_p \neq p)$ or $(computed_p \text{ is not prime}))$, then return **INVALID.**
- 11. Return VALID.

A.1.1.2 Generation of the Probable Primes *p* and *q* Using an Approved Hash Function

This method uses an Approved hash function and may be used for any application. The security strength of the hash function **shall** be equal to or greater than the security strength associated with the (L, N) pair. It is recommended that the security strength of the (L, N) pair and the hash function be the same unless an agreement has been made between participating entities to use a stronger hash function.

An arbitrary *domain_parameter_seed* of *seedlen* bits is also used, where *seedlen* **shall** be at least *N* bits.

The generation process returns a set of integers p and q that have a very high probability of being prime. For another entity to validate that the primes were generated correctly (using the validation process in Appendix A.1.1.3), the value of the *domain_parameter_seed* and the *counter* used to generate the primes must also be returned and made available to the validating entity; the *domain_parameter_seed* and *counter* need not be kept secret. Let **Hash** () be the selected hash function for the (L, N) pair, and let *outlen* be the bit length of the output block, where *outlen* shall be at least N bits.

The following process or its equivalent **shall** be used to generate p and q for this method.

Input:

- 1. L The desired length of the prime p.
- 2. N The desired length of the prime q.
- 3. *seedlen* The desired length of the domain parameter seed; the length of *seedlen* **shall** be at least *N* bits.

Output:

1.	status	The status returned from the generation procedure, where status is
		either VALID or INVALID. If INVALID is returned as the <i>status</i> ,
		either no values for the other output parameters shall be returned, or
		invalid values shall be returned (e.g., zeros or Null strings).
2.	<i>p</i> , <i>q</i>	The generated primes p and q .
3.	domain_paran	neter_seed
		(Optional) A seed that was used to generate p and q .

4. *counter* (Optional) A count value that was determined during generation.

Process:

- 1. Check that the (L,N) pair is in the list of acceptable (L, N pairs) (see Section 4.2). If the pair is not in the list, then return **INVALID**.
- 2. If (*seedlen* < *N*), then return **INVALID**.
- 3. $n = \lfloor L / outlen \rfloor 1$.
- 4. b = L 1 (n * outlen).
- 5. Get an arbitrary sequence of *seedlen* bits as the *domain_parameter_seed*.
- 6. U =**Hash** (*domain parameter seed*) mod 2^N .
- 7. $q = U \lor 2^{N-1} \lor 1$.
- 8. Use a robust primality testing algorithm to test whether q is a prime. See Appendix A.1.1.4.
- 9. If q is not a prime, then go to step 5.
- 10. offset = 1.
- 11. For *counter* = 0 to 4095 do
 - 11.1 For j = 0 to *n* do

 $V_j =$ **Hash** ((*domain_parameter_seed* + *offset* + *j*) mod 2^{*seedlen*}).

- 11.2 $W = V_0 + (V_1 * 2^{outlen}) + \dots + (V_{n-1} * 2^{(n-1) * outlen}) + ((V_n \mod 2^b) * 2^{n * outlen}).$
- 11.3 $X = W + 2^{L-1}$. Comment: $0 \le W < 2^{L-1}$; hence, $2^{L-1} \le X < 2^{L}$.
- 11.4 $c = X \mod 2q$.
- 11.5 p = X (c 1). Comment: $p \equiv 1 \mod 2q$.
- 11.6 If $(p < 2^{L-1})$, then go to step 11.9.

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	11.7	Use a robust primality testing alg Appendix A.1.1.4.	corithm to test whether p is prim	le. See
	11.8	If <i>p</i> is determined to be prime, th (optionally) the values of <i>domai</i>		1 / 1
	11.9	offset = offset + n + 1.	Comment: Increment <i>offset</i> ; the the loop in step 11, increment <i>counter</i> < 4096, repeat steps 11 11.8.	counter; if

12. Go to step 5.

A.1.1.3 Validation of the Probable Primes *p* and *q* that were Generated Using an **Approved Hash Function**

This prime validation algorithm is used to validate that the integers p and q were generated by the prime generation algorithm given in Appendix A.1.1.2. The validation algorithm requires the values of p, q, domain parameter seed and counter, which were output from the prime generation algorithm. Let **Hash** () be the hash function used to generate the (L, N) pair, and let outlen be its output block size.

The following process or its equivalent shall be used to validate p and q for this method.

Input:

1.	<i>p</i> , <i>q</i>	The generated primes p and q .
3.	domain_parameter_seed	The domain parameter seed that was used to generate p and
		q.
4.	counter	A count value that was determined during generation.
Outpu	t:	
1.	status	The status returned from the validation procedure, where

status is either **VALID** or **INVALID**.

Process:

- 1. L = len(p).
- 2. N = len(q).
- 3. Check that the (L, N) pair is in the list of acceptable (L, N) pairs (see Section 4.2). If the pair is not in the list, return INVALID.
- 4. If (*counter* > 4095), then return **INVALID**.
- 5. seedlen = len (domain parameter seed).
- 6. If (seedlen < (N)), then return **INVALID**.

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- 7. U =**Hash** (*domain_parameter_seed*) mod 2^{N} .
- 8. *computed_q* = $U \lor 2^{N-1} \lor 1$.
- Use a robust primality testing algorithm to test whether *computed_q* is prime. See Appendix A.1.1.4. If (*computed_q ≠ q*) or (*computed_q* is not prime), then return INVALID.
- 10. $n = \lfloor L / outlen \rfloor 1$.
- 11. b = L 1 (n * outlen).
- 12. offset = 1.
- 13. For i = 0 to *counter* do
 - 13.1 For j = 0 to *n* do

 V_i = Hash ((domain parameter seed + offset + j) mod 2^{seedlen}).

13.2 $W = V_0 + (V_1 * 2^{outlen}) + \dots + (V_{n-1} * 2^{(n-1) * outlen}) + ((V_n \mod 2^b) * 2^{n * outlen}).$

13.3
$$X = W + 2^{L-1}$$

- 13.4 $c = X \mod 2q$.
- 13.5 *computed_p* = X (c 1).
- 13.6 If (*computed* $p < 2^{L-1}$), then go to step 13.9
- 13.7 Use a robust primality testing algorithm to test whether *computed_p* is a prime. See Appendix A.1.1.4.
- 13.8 If *computed* p is determined to be a prime, then go to step 15.
- 13.9 offset = offset + n + 1.
- 14. If $((i \neq counter)$ or $(computed_p \neq p)$ or $(computed_p$ is not a prime)), then return **INVALID.**

15. Return VALID.

A.1.1.4 Probabilistic Primality Tests

A probabilistic primality test is required during the generation and validation of p and q using the methods specified above. An Approved robust probabilistic primality test **shall** be selected and used so that the probability of a non-prime number passing the test is at most 2⁻¹⁰⁰. An Approved test is provided below.

There are several fast probabilistic algorithms available. The following algorithm is a simplified version of a procedure due to M.O. Rabin, based in part on ideas of Gary L. Miller. For more information, see Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming, Vol. 2, Addison-Wesley, 1981, Algorithm P, page 379.

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In the following routine, let *iterations* be a fixed integer such that *iterations* \geq 50. Let **RBG** (...) be an Approved random bit generator (see SP 800-90).

Two processes are provided to test primality; each process or its functional equivalent can be used to test primality.

A.1.1.4.1 Miller-Rabin Probabilistic Primality Test

The test proceeds as follows:

Input:

1. w The (odd) integer to be tested for primality. This will be either p or q.

Output:

1. *status* The status returned from the validation procedure, where status is either **PROBABLY PRIME** or **COMPOSITE**

Process:

- 1. Let *a* be the largest integer such that 2^a divides *w*-1.
- 2. $m = (w-1) / 2^{a}$
- 3. wlen = len (w).
- 4. For i = 1 to *iterations* do
 - 4.1 Obtain a string *b* of *wlen* bits from an RBG.

Comment: Disallow 0, 1 and w-1.

- 4.2 If $((b \le 1) \text{ or } (b \ge w-1))$, then go to step 4.1.
- 4.3 $z = b^m \mod w$.
- 4.4 If ((z = 1) or (z = w 1)), then go to step 4.7.
- 4.5 For j = 1 to a 1 do.
 - $4.5.1 \quad z = z^2 \bmod w.$
 - 4.5.2 If (z = w-1), then go to step 4.7.
 - 4.5.3 If (z = 1), then go to step 4.6.

4.6 Return COMPOSITE.

4.7 Continue.	Comment: Increment <i>i</i> for the do-loop in
	step 4.

5. Return PROBABLY PRIME.

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A.1.1.4.2 Enhanced Miller-Rabin Probabilistic Primality Test

The test proceeds as follows:

Input:

1. w	The odd integer to be tested for primality. This will be either p or
	q.

Output:

```
1. status The status returned from the validation procedure, where status is either PROBABLY PRIME, PROVABLY COMPOSITE WITH FACTOR (returned with the factor), and PROVABLY COMPOSITE AND NOT A POWER OF A PRIME.
```

Process:

- 1. Let *a* be the largest integer such that 2^a divides *w*-1.
- 2. $m = (w-1) / 2^{a}$
- 3. *wlen* = **len** (*w*).
- 4. For i = 1 to *iterations* do
 - 4.1 Obtain a string *b* of *wlen* bits from an RBG.

Comment: Disallow 0, 1 and *w*-1.

- 4.2 If $((b \le 1) \text{ or } (b \ge w-1))$, then go to step 4.1.
- 4.3 $g = \mathbf{GCD}(b, w)$.
- 4.4 If (g > 1), then return **PROVABLY COMPOSITE WITH FACTOR** and the value of g.
- 4.5 $z = b^m \mod w$.
- 4.6 If ((z = 1) or (z = w 1)), then go to step 4.15.
- 4.7 For j = 1 to a 1 do.
 - 4.7.1 x = z. Comment: $x \neq 1$ and $x \neq w-1$.
 - $4.7.2 \quad z = x^2 \bmod w.$
 - 4.7.3 If (z = w-1), then go to step 4.15.
 - 4.7.4 If (z = 1), then go to step 4.12.

4.8 x = z. Comment: $x = b^{(w-1)/2} \mod w$ and $x \neq w-1$.

- 4.9 $z = x^2 \mod w$.
- 4.10 If (z = 1), then go to step 4.12.

4.11 $x = z$.	Comment: $x = b^{(w-1)} \mod w$ and $x \neq 1$.

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 $4.12 g = \mathbf{GCD} (x-1, w).$

4.13 If (g > 1), then return **PROVABLY COMPOSITE WITH FACTOR** and the value of g.

4.14 Return **PROVABLY COMPOSITE AND NOT A POWER OF A PRIME.**

4.15 Continue. Comment: Increment *i* for the do-loop in

step 4.

5. Return PROBABLY PRIME.

A.1.2 Construction and Validation of the Primes *p* and *q*

Primes can be generated so that they are guaranteed to be prime. The following algorithm for generating p and q uses an Approved hash function for the (L, N) pair (see Section 4.2 for DSA), and an arbitrary seed (*domain_parameter_seed*) to construct p and q in the required intervals. The security strength of the hash function **shall** be equal to or greater than the security strength associated with the (L, N) pair. It is recommended that the security strength of the (L, N) pair and the hash function be the same unless an agreement has been made between participating entities to use a stronger hash function.

Arbitrary seeds can be anything, e.g., a user's favorite number or a random or pseudorandom number that is output from a random number generator. Note that the *domain_parameter_seed* must be unique to produce a unique set of domain parameters. Candidate primes are tested for primality using a deterministic primality test that proves whether or not the candidate is prime. The resulting p and q are guaranteed to be primes.

A.1.2.1 Construction of the Primes *p* and *q* Using the Shawe-Taylor Algorithm

For each set of domain parameters generated, an arbitrary initial seed (*firstseed*) of at least *seedlen* bits **shall** be determined, where *seedlen* **shall** be $\ge N$ bits.

The generation process returns a set of integers p and q that are guaranteed to be prime. For another entity to validate that the primes were generated correctly (using the validation process in Appendix A.1.2.2), the value of the *domain_parameter_seed* and the *counter* used to generate the primes must be made available to the validating entity; the *domain_parameter_seed* and the *counter* need not be kept secret. The domain parameters for DSA are identified in Section 4.3 as $(p, q, g, \{domain_parameter_seed, counter\}$). When using the Shawe-Taylor algorithm for generating p and q, the *domain_parameter_seed* consists of three seed values (*firstseed, pseed,* and *qseed*), and the *counter* consists of the pair of counter values (*pgen_counter* and *qgen_counter*).

Let **Hash** () be the selected hash function for the (L, N) pair, and let *outlen* be the bit length of the output block of that hash function.

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A.1.2.1.1 Get the First Seed

The following process or its equivalent **shall** be used to generate *firstseed* for this constructive method.

Input:

1. N	The length of q in bits.
2. seedlen	The length of firstseed, where <i>seedlen</i> $\geq N$.
.Output:	
1. status	The status returned from the validation procedure, where <i>status</i> is either SUCCESS or FAILURE . If FAILURE is returned, then either no <i>firstseed</i> value shall be provided or an invalid value shall be returned.
2. firstseed	The first seed generated.

Process:

- 1. firstseed = 0.
- 2. Check that N is in the list of acceptable (L, N) pairs (see Section 4.2). If not, then return **FAILURE**.
- 3. If (*seedlen* < *N*), then return **FAILURE**.
- 4. While *firstseed* $< 2^{N-1}$.

Get an arbitrary sequence of seedlen bits as firstseed.

5. Return SUCCESS and the value of *firstseed*.

Note: This routine could be incorporated into the beginning of the constructive prime generation procedure in Appendix A.1.2.1.2. However, this was not done in this specification so that the validation process in Appendix A.1.2.2 could also call the constructive prime generation procedure and provide the value of *firstseed* as input.

A.1.2.1.2 Constructive Prime Generation

The following process or its equivalent **shall** be used to generate p and q for this constructive method.

Input:

1. <i>L</i>	The requested length for <i>p</i> .
2. <i>N</i>	The requested length for q .
3. firstseed	The first seed to be used. This was obtained as specified in Appendix A.1.2.1.1.

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Outpu	ıt:		
1.	status	The status returned from the generation procedure, w either SUCCESS or FAILURE. If FAILURE is returned either no other values shall be returned, or invalid vareturned.	urned, then
2.	<i>p</i> , <i>q</i>	The requested primes.	
3.	pseed, qseed	(Optional) Seed values that were used to generate p a entire <i>seed</i> for the generation of p and q consists of fi and <i>qseed</i> .	1
4.	pgen_counter, qg	gen_counter	

(Optional) The count values that were determined during generation.

Process:

1. Check that the (L, N) pair is in the list of acceptable (L, N) pairs (see Section 4.2). If the pair is not in the list, return **FAILURE**.

Comment: Use the **Random_Prime()** routine in Appendix A.1.2.3 to generate random primes.

- 2. Using *N* as the length and *firstseed* as the *input_seed*, use the random prime generation routine in Appendix A.1.2.3 to obtain *q*, *qseed* and *qgen_counter*. If **FAILURE** is returned, then return **FAILURE**.
- 3. Using $\lfloor L/2 + 1 \rfloor$ and *qseed*, use the random prime routine in Appendix A.1.2.3 to obtain p_0 , *pseed*, and *pgen_counter*. If **FAILURE** is returned, then return **FAILURE**.
- 4. *iterations* = $\lceil L / outlen \rceil$ -1.
- 5. *old_counter = pgen_counter*.

Comment: Generate a (pseudo) random *x* in the interval $[2^{L-1}, 2^L]$.

- 6. x = 0.
- 7. For i = 0 to *iterations* do

x = x + (**Hash** (*pseed* + *i*) * 2^{*i*×outlen}).

- 8. pseed = pseed + iterations + 1.
- 9. $x = 2^{L-1} + (x \mod 2^{L-1}).$

Comment: Generate p, a candidate for the

prime, in the interval $[2^{L-1}, 2^L]$.

- $10. t = \lceil x / (2qp_0) \rceil.$
- 11. If $(2tqp_0 + 1) > 2^L$, then $t = \lceil 2^{L-1} / (2qp_0) \rceil$.
- 12. $p = 2tqp_0 + 1$.
- $13. pgen_counter = pgen_counter + 1.$

Comment: Test p for primality; choose an integer a in the interval [2, p-2].

- 14. a = 0
- 15. For i = 0 to *iterations* do

 $a = a + (\text{Hash}(pseed + i) * 2^{i \times outlen}).$

- 16. pseed = pseed + iterations + 1.
- 17. $a = 2 + (a \mod (p-3))$.
- 18. $z = a^{2tq} \mod p$.
- 19. If $((1 = \mathbf{GCD}(z-1, p))$ and $(1 = z^{p_0} \mod p))$, then return **SUCCESS** and the values of *p*, *q* and (optionally) *pseed*, *qseed*, *pgen_counter*, and *qgen_counter*.
- 20. If $(pgen_counter > (4L + old_counter))$, then **return FAILURE.**
- 21. t = t + 1.
- 22. Go to step 11.

A.1.2.2 Validation of the Primes *p* and *q* that were Constructed Using the Shawe-Taylor Algorithm

The validation of the primes p and q that were generated by the method described in Appendix A.1.2.1.2 may be performed if the values of L, N, *firstseed*, *pseed*, *qseed*, *pgen_counter* and *qgen_counter* were saved and are provided for use in the following algorithm. Note that L and N can be determined from p and q.

The following process or its equivalent **shall** be used to validate p and q for this constructive method.

Input:

- 1. p, q The primes to be validated.
- 2. *firstseed, pseed, qseed* Seed values that were used to generate *p* and *q*.
- 3. pgen counter, qgen counter

The count values that were determined during generation.

Output:

1.	status	The status returned from the generation procedure, where
		status is either SUCCESS or FAILURE.

Process:

- 1. L = len(p).
- 2. N = len(q).
- 3. Check that the (L, N) pair is in the list of acceptable (L, N) pairs (see Section 4.2). If the pair is not in the list, then return **FAILURE**.
- 4. If (*firstseed* $< 2^{N-1}$), then return **FAILURE**.
- 5. If $(2^N \le q)$, then return **FAILURE**).
- 6. If $(2^L \le p)$, then return **FAILURE**.
- 7. If $((p 1) \mod q \neq 0)$, then return **FAILURE**.
- 8. Using L, N and *firstseed*, perform the constructive prime generation procedure in Appendix A.1.2.1.2 to obtain p_val, q_val, pseed_val, qseed_val, pgen_counter_val, and qgen_counter_val. If FAILURE is returned, or if (q_val ≠ q) or (qseed_val ≠ qseed) or (qgen_counter_val ≠ qgen_counter) or (p_val ≠ p) or (pseed_val ≠ pseed) or (pgen_counter_val ≠ pgen_counter), then return FAILURE.
- 9. Return SUCCESS.

A.1.2.3 The Random_Prime Routine

This routine is recursive and called from Appendix A.1.2.1.2 during the generation of the primes p and q to obtain a prime number.

Let **Hash** () be the selected hash function for the (L, N) pair, and let *outlen* be the bit length of the hash function output block. The following process or its equivalent **shall** be used to generate a prime number for this constructive method.

ST_Random_Prime ():

Input:

1. *length* The length of the prime to be generated.

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2. input_seed		The seed to be used for the generation of the requested prime.	
	Output:		
	1. statusThe status returned from the generation re status is either SUCCESS or FAILURE.		,
	2. prime	The requested prime.	
	3 prime_seed	A seed determined during generation.	

4. *prime_gen_counter* A counter detremined during the generation of the prime.

Process:

- 1. If (length < 2), then return **FAILURE**.
- 2. If $(length \ge 33)$, then go to step 14.
- 3. *prime_seed = input_seed*.
- 4. $prime_gen_counter = 0$.

Comment: Generate a pseudorandom integer *c* of *length* bits.

- 5. $c = \text{Hash}(prime_seed) \oplus \text{Hash}(prime_seed + 1).$
- 6. $c = 2^{length 1} + (c \mod 2^{length 1}).$
- 7. $c = (2 * \lfloor c / 2 \rfloor) + 1.$

Comment: This sets the low order bit of c to 1.

- 8. *prime_gen_counter = prime_gen_counter + 1*.
- 9. $prime_seed = prime_seed + 2$.
- 10. Perform a deterministic primality test on *c*. For example, since *c* is small, its primality can be tested by trial division. See Appendix D.3.
- 11. If (c is a prime number), then
 - 11.1 prime = c.
 - 11.2 Return **SUCCESS** and the values of *prime_prime_seed* and *prime_gen_counter*.
- 12. If (*prime_gen_counter* > (4 * *length*)), then return **FAILURE**
- 13. Go to step 5.
- 14. (*status*, c_0 , *prime_seed*, *prime_gen_counter*) = (**ST_Random_Prime** (($\lceil length / 2 \rceil +$

- 1), input seed).
- 15. If FAILURE is returned, return FAILURE.
- 16. *iterations* = $\lceil length / outlen \rceil 1$.
- 17. old counter = prime gen counter.

Comment: Generate a pseudorandom integer x in the interval $[2^{length-1}, 2^{length}]$.

- 18. x = 0.
- 19. For i = 0 to *iterations* do
 - x = x + (**Hash** (prime seed + i) * $2^{i \times outlen}$).
- $20. prime_seed = prime_seed + iterations + 1.$
- 21. $x = 2^{length 1} + (x \mod 2^{length 1}).$

Comment: Generate a candidate prime *c* in the interval $[2^{length-1}, 2^{length}]$.

- 22. $t = [x / (2c_0)].$
- 23. If $(2tc_0 + 1 > 2^{length})$, then $t = \lceil 2^{length 1} / (2c_0) \rceil$.
- 24. $c = 2tc_0 + 1$.

25. prime_gen_counter = prime_gen_counter + 1.

Comment: Test the candidate prime c for primality; first pick an integer a between 2 and c - 2.

- 26. *a* = 0.
- 27. For i = 0 to *iterations* do

 $a = a + (\text{Hash }(prime \ seed + i) * 2^{i \times outlen}).$

- 28. *prime_seed* = *prime_seed* + *iterations* + 1.
- 29. $a = 2 + (a \mod (c 3))$.
- 30. $z = a^{2t} \mod c$.
- 31. If $((1 = \mathbf{GCD} (z 1, c)) \text{ and } (1 = z^{c_0} \mod c))$, then
 - 31.1 *prime* = c.
 - 31.2 Return **SUCCESS** and the values of *prime_seed* and *prime_gen_counter*.

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32. If (*prime_gen_counter* > ((4 * *length*) + *old_counter*)), then return FAILURE.
33. *t* = *t* + 1.
34. Go to step 23.

A.2 Generation of the Generator g

The generator g depends on the values of p and q. Two methods for determining the generator g are provided; one of these methods **shall** be used. The first method, discussed in Appendix A.2.1, may be used when complete validation of the generator g is not required; it is recommended that this method be used only when the party generating g is trusted to not deliberately generate a g that has a known arithmetic relationship to another generator g'. Appendix A.2.2 provides a method for partial validation when the method of generation in Appendix A.2.1 is used. The second method for generating g, discussed in Appendix A.2.3, **shall** be used when validation of the generator g is required; the method for the validation of a generator determined using the method in Appendix A.2.3 is provided in Appendix A.2.4.

A.2.1 Unverifiable Generation of the Generator g

This method is used to determine a value for g, based on the values of p and q. It may be used when validation of the generator g is not required. The correct generation of g cannot be completely validated (see Appendix A.2.2). Note that this generation method for g was also specified in previous versions of this Standard.

The following process or its equivalent shall be used to generate the generator g for this method.

Input:

1. p, q The generated primes.

Output:

1. g The requested value of g.

Process:

- 1. e = (p 1)/q.
- 2. Set h = any integer satisfying 1 < h < (p 1), such that h differs from any value previously tried. Note that h could be obtained from a random number generator or from a counter that changes after each use.
- 3. $g = h^e \mod p$.
- 4. If (g = 1), then go to step 2.
- 5. Return g.

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A.2.2 Assurance of the Validity of the Generator g

The order of the generator g that was generated using Appendix A.2.1 can be partially validated by checking the range and order, thereby performing a partial validation of g.

The following process or its equivalent **shall** be used when partial validation of the generator g is required:

Input:

1. p, q, g The domain parameters.

Output:

1. *status* The status returned from the generation routine, where *status* is either **PARTIALLY VALID** or **INVALID**.

Process:

- 1. Verify that $2 \le g \le (p-1)$. If not true, return **INVALID.**
- 2. If $(g^q = 1 \mod p)$, then return **PARTIALLY VALID.**
- 3. Return INVALID.

The non-existence of a relationship of g to another generator g' (that is known to the entity that generated g, but may not be known by other entities) cannot be checked. In this sense, the correct generation of g cannot be completely validated.

A.2.3 Verifiable Generation of the Generator g

The generation of g is based on the values of p, q and domain_parameter_seed (which are outputs of the generation processes in Appendix A.1). When p and q were generated using the method in Appendix A.1.1.2, the domain_parameter_seed value must have been returned from the generation routine. When p and q were generated using the method in Appendix A.1.2.1, the *firstseed*, pseed, and qseed values must have been returned from the generation routine; firstseed, pseed, and qseed shall be concatenated to form the domain_parameter_seed used in the following process.

This method of generating a generator g can be validated (see Appendix A.2.4).

This generation method supports the generation of multiple values of g for specific values of p and q. The use of different values of g for the same p and q may be used to support key separation; for example, using the g that is generated with *index* = 1 for digital signatures and with *index* = 2 for key establishment.

Let **Hash** () be the selected hash function for the (L, N) pair. The following process or its equivalent **shall** be used to generate the generator g.

Input:

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1.	<i>p</i> , <i>q</i>	The primes.	
2.	domain_parameter_seed	The seed used during the ge	eneration of p and q .
3.	index	The index to be used for ger represented as an unsigned	•••
Outp	ut:		
1.	<i>status</i> The status return VALID or INV	ned from the generation rout	ine, where status is either
2.	g The value of g t	hat was generated.	
Proce	ss:	Note: count is an unsi	gned 16-bit integer.
		Comment: Check that been provided (see ab	a valid value of the <i>index</i> has ove).
1.	If (<i>index</i> is incorrect), then	return INVALID.	
2.	N = len (q) .		
3.	e = (p - 1)/q.		
4.	count = 0.		
5. $count = count + 1$.			
		Comment: Check that to 0.	count does not wrap around
6.	If $(count = 0)$, then return I	NVALID.	
		Comment: the length domain_parameter_set	of the <i>red</i> has already been checked.
7. $U = domain_parameter_se$		ed "ggen" index count	t.
8. $W = $ Hash (U).			
9.	$g = W^e \mod p.$		
10	If $(g < 2)$, then go to step 5	Comment: If a genera	tor has not been found.
11	. Return VALID and the val	ue of g.	
	alidation Routine when t outine Was Used	he Canonical Generatior	of the Generator g
Appendix	A.2.3, based on the values of	te the value of g that was gen of p, q, domain_parameter_se of p and q have been previou	eed, and the appropriate value

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Appendix A.1. Note that the method specified in Appendix A.2.3 for the generation of g was not included in previous versions of this Standard; therefore, this validation method is not appropriate for that case.

The *domain_parameter_seed* is an output from the generation of p and q. When p and q were generated using the method in Appendix A.1.1.2, the *domain_parameter_seed* must have been returned from the generation routine and made available to the validating party. When p and q were generated using the method in Appendix A.1.2.1, the *firstseed*, *pseed*, and *qseed* values must have been returned from the generation routine and made available; *firstseed*, *pseed*, and *qseed* shall be concatenated to form the *domain_parameter_seed* used in the following process. Let **Hash** () be the selected hash function for the (L, N) pair.

The input *index* is the index number for the generator g. See Appendix A.2.3 for more details.

The following process or its equivalent **shall** be used to validate the generator g for this method.

Input:

1. <i>p</i> , <i>q</i>	The primes.	
2. domain_parameter_seed	The seed used to generate p and q .	
3. index	The index used in Appendix A.2.3 to generate <i>x</i> . <i>index</i> is represented as an unsigned 8-bit integer.	
4. g	The value of g to be validated.	
Output:		
1. status	The status returned from the generation routine, where <i>status</i> is either VALID or INVALID .	
Process:	Note: count is an unsigned 16-bit integer.	
	Comment: Check that a valid value of the <i>index</i> has been provided (see above).	

- 1. If (index is incorrect), then return INVALID.
- 2. Verify that $2 \le g \le (p-1)$. If not true, return **INVALID**.
- 3. If $(g^q \neq 1 \mod p)$, then return **INVALID**.
- 4. N = len(q).
- 5. e = (p 1)/q.
- 6. count = 0.
- 7. count = count + 1.

Comment: Check that *count* does not wrap around to 0.

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- 8. If (count = 0), then return **INVALID**.
- 9. U = domain_parameter_seed || "ggen" || index || count.
- 10. W =**Hash** (U).
- 11. *computed_g* = $W^e \mod p$.
- 12. If (*computed_g* < 2), then go to step 7. Comment: If a generator has not been found.
- 13. If (*computed_g = g*), then return **VALID**, else return **INVALID**.

APPENDIX B: Key Pair Generation

Discrete logarithm cryptography (DLC) is divided into finite field cryptography (FFC) and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC); the difference between the two is the type of math that is used. DSA is an example of FFC; ECDSA is an example of ECC. Other examples of DLC are the Diffie-Hellman and MQV key agreement algorithms, which have both FFC and ECC forms.

The most common example of integer factorization cryptography (IFC) is RSA.

This appendix specifies methods for the generation of FFC and ECC key pairs and secret numbers, and the generation of IFC key pairs. All generation methods require the use of a properly instantiated random bit generator (RBG) as discussed in SP 800-90; the RBG **shall** have a security strength equal to or greater than the security strength associated with the key pairs and secret numbers to be generated. See SP 800-57 for guidance on security strengths and key sizes.

B.1 FFC Key Pair Generation

An FFC key pair (x, y) is generated for a set of domain parameters $(p, q, g \{, domain_parameter_seed, counter\})$. Two methods are provided for the generation of the FFC private key x and public key y; one of these two methods **shall** be used. Prior to generating DSA key pairs, assurance of the validity of the domain parameters (p, q and g) **shall** have been obtained as specified in Section 3.1.

For DSA, the valid values of *L* and *N* are provided in Section 4.2.

B.1.1 Key Pair Generation Using Extra Random Bits

In this method, 64 more bits are requested from the RBG than are needed for x so that bias produced by the mod function in step 6 is negligible.

The following process or its equivalent may be used to generate an FFC key pair.

Input:

(p, q, g)	The subset of the domain parameters that are used for this process. p, q
	and g shall either be provided as integers during input, or shall be
	converted to integers prior to use.

Output:

1.	status	The status returned from the key pair generation process. The status will indicate SUCCESS or an ERROR .
2.	(x, y)	The generated private and public keys. If an error is encountered during the generation process, invalid values for <i>x</i>

and *y* **should** be returned, as represented by *Invalid_x* and *Invalid_y* in the following specification. *x* and *y* are returned as integers. The generated private key *x* is in the range [1, q-1], and the public key is in the range [1, p-1].

Process:

1. N = len(q); L = len(p).

Comment: Check that the (L, N) pair is specified in Section 4.2.

- 2. If the (*L*, *N*) pair is invalid, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid_x*, and *Invalid_y*.
- 3. *requested_security_strength* = the security strength associated with the (*L*, *N*) pair; see SP 800-57.
- 4. Obtain a string of *N*+64 *returned_bits* from an **RBG** with a security strength of *requested_security_strength* or more. If an **ERROR** status is returned, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid_x*, and *Invalid_y*.
- 5. Convert *returned_bits* to the (non-negative) integer *c* (see Appendix D.2.1).
- 6. $x = (c \mod (q-1)) + 1$. Comment: $0 \le c \mod (q-1) \le q-2$ and implies that $1 \le x \le q-1$.
- 7. $y = g^x \mod p$.
- 8. Return **SUCCESS**, *x*, and *y*.

B.1.2 Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates

In this method, a random number is obtained and tested to determine that it will produce a value of x in the correct range. If x is out-of-range, another random number is obtained (i.e., the process is iterated until an acceptable value of x is obtained.

The following process or its equivalent may be used to generate an FFC key pair.

Input:

(p, q, g)	The subset of the domain parameters that are used for this process. p, q
	and g shall either be provided as integers during input, or shall be
	converted to integers prior to use.

Output:

1. status	The status returned from the key pair generation process. The status will indicate SUCCESS or an ERROR .
2. (x, y)	The generated private and public keys. If an error is encountered during the generation process, invalid values for x

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and *y* **should** be returned, as represented by *Invalid_x* and *Invalid_y* in the following specification. *x* and *y* are returned as integers. The generated private key *x* is in the range [1, q-1], and the public key is in the range [1, p-1].

Process:

1. N = len(q); L = len(p).

Comment: Check that the (L, N) pair is specified in Section 4.2.

- 2. If the (*L*, *N*) pair is invalid, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid_x*, and *Invalid_y*.
- 3. *requested_security_strength* = the security strength associated with the (*L*, *N*) pair; see SP 800-57.
- 4. Obtain a string of *N returned_bits* from an **RBG** with a security strength of *requested_security_strength* or more. If an **ERROR** status is returned, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid_x*, and *Invalid_y*.
- 5. Convert *returned_bits* to the (non-negative) integer *c* (see Appendix D.2.1).
- 6. If (c > q-2), then go to step 4.
- 7. x = c + 1.
- 8. $y = g^x \mod p$.
- 9. Return **SUCCESS**, *x*, and *y*.

B.2 FFC Per-Message Secret Number Generation

DSA requires the generation of a new random number k for each message to be signed. Two methods are provided for the generation of k; one of these two methods **shall** be used.

The valid values of N are provided in Section 4.2. Let **inverse** (k, q) be a function that computes the inverse of a (non-negative) integer k with respect to multiplication modulo the prime number q. A technique for computing the inverse is provided in Appendix D.1.

B.2.1 Per-Message Secret Number Generation Using Extra Random Bits

In this method, 64 more bits are requested from the RBG than are needed for k so that bias produced by the mod function in step 6 is not readily apparent.

The following process or its equivalent may be used to generate a per-message secret number.

Input:

(p, q, g) DSA domain parameters that are generated as specified in Section 4.3.1.

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Output:		
1. status	The status returned from the secret number generation process. The status will indicate SUCCESS or an ERROR .	
2. (k, k^{-1})	The per-message secret number k and an error is encountered during the g values for k and k^{-1} should be return <i>Invalid</i> k and <i>Invalid</i> k and <i>Invalid</i> k and k ⁻¹ are in the range [1, q-1].	eneration process, invalid ned, as represented by
R		

Process:

1. N = len(q); L = len(p).

Comment: Check that the (L, N) pair is specified in Section 4.2.

- 2. If the (L, N) pair is invalid, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid* k, and *Invalid* k inverse.
- 3. requested security strength = the security strength associated with the (L, N) pair; see SP 800-57.
- 4. Obtain a string of N+64 returned bits from an **RBG** with a security strength of requested security strength or more. If an **ERROR** status is returned, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid k*, and *Invalid k inverse*.
- 5. Convert *returned bits* to the (non-negative) integer c (see Appendix D.2.1).
- 6. $k = (c \mod (q-1)) + 1$.
- 7. $(status, k^{-1}) = inverse(k, q).$
- 8. Return *status*, k, and k^{-1} .

B.2.2 Per-Message Secret Number Generation by Testing Candidates

In this method, a random number is obtained and tested to determine that it will produce a value of k in the correct range. If k is out-of-range, another random number is obtained (i.e., the process is iterated until an acceptable value of k is obtained.

The following process or its equivalent may be used to generate a per-message secret number.

Input:

Output:

1. status The status returned from the secret number generation process. The status will indicate **SUCCESS** or an **ERROR**.

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	2.	(k, k^{-1})	The per-message secret number k and is encountered during the generation p k and k^{-1} should be returned, as repress <i>Invalid</i> _ k^{-1} in the following specification range [1, q-1].	process, invalid values for ented by <i>Invalid_k</i> and

Process:

1. N = len(q); L = len(p).

Comment: Check that the (L, N) pair is specified in Section 4.2).

- 2. If the (L, N) pair is invalid, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid*_k, and *Invalid*_k⁻¹.
- 3. *requested_security_strength* = the security strength associated with the (*L*, *N*) pair; see SP 800-57.
- 4. Obtain a string of *N returned_bits* from an **RBG** with a security strength of *requested_security_strength* or more. If an **ERROR** status is returned, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid_k*, and *Invalid_k⁻¹*.
- 5. Convert *returned_bits* to the (non-negative) integer *c* (see Appendix D.2.1).
- 6. If (c > q-2), then go to step 4.
- 7. k = c + 1.
- 8. $(status, k^{-1}) = inverse(k, q).$
- 9. Return *status*, k, and k^{-1} .

B.3 IFC Key Pair Generation

B.3.1 Criteria for IFC Key Pairs

RSA keys shall meet the following criteria in order to conform to FIPS 186-3:

- 1. The public exponent *e* shall be selected with the following constraints:
 - (a) The public verification exponent *e* shall be selected prior to generating the private signature exponent *d*.
 - (b) The exponent *e* shall be an odd positive integer such that:

 $65.537 \le e < 2^{nlen - 2 \times security_strength}$

where *nlen* is the length of the modulus *n* in bits.

Note that the value of e may be any value that meets constraint 1(b), and that p and q will be selected (in step 2) such that e is relatively prime to both (p-1) and (q-1).

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- 2. Two secret and randomly generated positive primes p and q shall be selected with the following constraints:
 - (a) (*p*-1) and (*q*-1) **shall** be relatively prime to the public exponent *e*.
 - (b) The four numbers $(p \pm 1)$ and $(q \pm 1)$ shall have prime factors (denoted as p_1, p_2, q_1 and q_2) that are greater than $2^{security_strength+20}$ and less than $2^{security_strength+40}$, such that:
 - (p-1) has a prime factor p_1
 - (p+1) has a prime factor p_2
 - (q-1) has a prime factor q_1
 - (q+1) has a prime factor q_2 .
 - (c) The private prime factor p shall be selected randomly from the primes that satisfy $(\sqrt{2})(2^{(nlen/2)-1}) \le p \le (2^{nlen/2}-1)$, where *nlen* is the bit length of the modulus n as specified in Section 5.1 for the desired *security_strength*.
 - (d) The private prime factor q shall be selected randomly from the primes that satisfy $(\sqrt{2})(2^{(nlen/2)-1}) \le q \le (2^{nlen/2}-1)$, where *nlen* is the length of the modulus n as specified in Section 5.1 for the desired *security_strength*.
 - (e) The difference between p and q shall be $> 2^{(nlen/2) (security_strength+20)}$.

An approved method for generating p and q with these constraints is provided in Appendix B.3.2.

3. The private signature exponent d shall be selected with the following constraints after the generation of p and q:

(a) The exponent d shall be a positive integer value such that $d > 2^{nlen/2}$, and

(b) $d = e^{-1} \mod (LCM((p-1), (q-1))).$

In the extremely rare event that $d \le 2^{nlen/2}$, then new values for *p*, *q* and *d* shall be determined, and a different value of *e* may be used.

B.3.2 Generation of the Prime Factors *p* and *q* for RSA

The following is an Approved method for the generation of the RSA prime factors p and q that satisfy the constraints of Appendix B.3.1.

Input:

nlen The intended bit length of the modulus *n*.

e The public verification exponent.

Output:

status The status of the generation process, where status is either **SUCCESS** or **FAILURE**.

p and *q* The private prime factors of *n*.

Process:

Comment: Determine the security strength (see SP 800-57).

1. Set the value of *security_strength* in accordance with the value of *nlen*. If *nlen* is not a valid value, Return (**FAILURE**, 0, 0).

Comment: Generate four primes p_1 , p_2 , q_1 and q_2 .

- 2. Generate four integers X_{p1} , X_{p2} , X_{q1} and X_{q2} , each between (*security_strength* + 21) and (*security_strength* + 40) bits in length, using an Approved random number generator that supports the *security_strength*.
- 3. Sequentially search successive integers, starting at X_{p1} until the first prime p_1 is found. Candidate integers **shall** be tested using the Miller-Rabin Probabilistic Primality test in Appendix A.1.1.4, setting *iterations* \geq 27, in this case. Repeat the process to find p_2 , starting at X_{p2} . p_1 and p_2 **shall** be the first integers that pass the primality test.
- 4. Repeat the process in step 3 to find q_1 , starting at X_{q_1} ; and q_2 , starting at Xq_2 . q_1 and q_2 shall be the first integers that pass the primality test.
- 5. Generate a prime *p* using the routine in Appendix D.5 with inputs of p_1 , p_2 , *e* and *security_strength.*
- 6. Generate a prime q using the routine in Appendix D.5 with inputs of q_1 , q_2 , e and *security_strength*.
- 7. If $(|p q| \le 2^{nlen/2 (security_strength+20)})$, then Comment: This is extremely rare.
 - 7.1 Generate two integers X_{q1} and X_{q2} , each between (*security_strength* + 21) and (*security_strength* + 40) bits in length, using an Approved random number generator that supports the *security_strength*.
 - 7.2 Go to step 4.
- 8. Return (SUCCESS, p, q).

B.4 ECC Key Pair Generation

An ECC key pair *d* and *Q* is generated for a set of domain parameters (*q*, *FR*, *a*, *b*, {*SEED*}, *G*, *n*, *h*). Two methods are provided for the generation of the ECC private key *d* and public key *Q*;

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one of these two methods **shall** be used to generate d and Q. Prior to generating ECDSA key pairs, assurance of the validity of the domain parameters (q, FR, a, b, {SEED}, G, n, h) **shall** have been obtained as specified in Section 3.1.

For ECDSA, the valid bit-lengths of n are provided in Section 6.1.1. See ANS X9.62 for definitions of the elliptic curve math and the conversion routines.

B.4.1 Key Pair Generation Using Extra Random Bits

In this method, 64 more bits are requested from the RBG than are needed for d so that bias produced by the mod function in step 6 is negligible.

The following process or its equivalent may be used to generate an ECC key pair.

Input:

 $(q, FR, a, b, \{SEED\}, G, n, h)$ The domain parameters that are used for this process. *n* is a prime number, and *G* is a point on the elliptic curve.

Output:

1.	status	The status returned from the key pair generation procedure. The status will indicate SUCCESS or an ERROR .
2.	(<i>d</i> , <i>Q</i>)	The generated private and public keys. If an error is encountered during the generation process, invalid values for d and Q should be returned, as represented by <i>Invalid_d</i> and <i>Invalid_Q</i> in the following specification. d is an integer, and Q is an elliptic curve point. The generated private key d is in the range [1, n -1].

Process:

1. N = len(n).

Comment: Check that *N* is included in Table 1 of Section 6.1.1.

- 2. If *N* is invalid, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid_d*, and *Invalid_Q*.
- 3. *requested_security_strength* = the security strength associated with *N*; see SP 800-57.
- 4. Obtain a string of *N*+64 *returned_bits* from an **RBG** with a security strength of *requested_security_strength* or more. If an **ERROR** status is returned, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid_d*, and *Invalid_Q*.
- 5. Convert *returned_bits* to the (non-negative) integer *c* (see Appendix D.2.1).
- 6. $d = (c \mod (n-1)) + 1$.
- 7. Q = dG.

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8. Return **SUCCESS**, *d*, and *Q*.

B.4.2 Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates

In this method, a random number is obtained and tested to determine that it will produce a value of d in the correct range. If d is out-of-range, another random number is obtained (i.e., the process is iterated until an acceptable value of d is obtained.

The following process or its equivalent may be used to generate an ECC key pair.

Input:

```
(q, FR, a, b, \{SEED\}, G, n, h) The domain parameters that are used for this process. n is a prime number, and G is a point on the elliptic curve.
```

Output:

1.	status	The status returned from the key pair generation procedure. The status will indicate SUCCESS or an ERROR .
2.	(<i>d</i> , <i>Q</i>)	The generated private and public keys. If an error is encountered during the generation process, invalid values for d and Q should be returned, as represented by <i>Invalid_d</i> and <i>Invalid_Q</i> in the following specification. d is an integer, and Q is an elliptic curve point. The generated private key d is in the range [1, n -1].

Process:

1. N = len(n).

Comment: Check that *N* is included in Table 1 of Section 6.1.1.

- 2. If *N* is invalid, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid_d*, and *Invalid_Q*.
- 3. *requested_security_strength* = the security strength associated with *N*; see SP 800-57.
- 4. Obtain a string of *N returned_bits* from an **RBG** with a security strength of *requested_security_strength* or more. If an **ERROR** status is returned, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid_d*, and *Invalid_Q*.
- 5. Convert *returned_bits* to the (non-negative) integer *c* (see Appendix D.2.1).
- 6. If (c > n-2), then go to step 4.
- 7. d = c + 1.

8. Q = dG.

9. Return SUCCESS, *d*, and *Q*.

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B.5 ECC Per-Message Secret Number Generation

ECDSA requires the generation of a new random number *k* for each message to be signed. Two methods are provided for the generation of *k*; one of these two methods **shall** be used.

The valid values of n are provided in Section 6.1.1. See ANS X9.62 for definitions of the elliptic curve math and the conversion routines.

Let **inverse** (k, n) be a function that computes the inverse of a (non-negative) integer k with respect to multiplication modulo the prime number n. A technique for computing the inverse is provided in Appendix D.1.

B.5.1 Per-Message Secret Number Generation Using Extra Random Bits

In this method, 64 more bits are requested from the RBG than are needed for k so that bias produced by the mod function in step 6 is not readily apparent.

The following process or its equivalent may be used to generate a per-message secret number.

Input:

(q, FR, a, b, {SEED}, G, n, h) The domain parameters that are used for this process. n is a prime number, and G is a point on the elliptic curve.

Output:

1.	status	The status returned from the key pair generation procedure. The status will indicate SUCCESS or an ERROR .
2.	(k, k^{-1})	The generated private and public keys. If an error is encountered during the generation process, invalid values for k and k^{-1} should be returned, as represented by <i>Invalid_k</i> and <i>Invalid_k_inverse</i> in the following specification. k and k^{-1} are integers. k and k^{-1} are integers in the range [1, n -1].

Process:

1. N = len(q).

Comment: Check that *N* is included in Table 1 of Section 6.1.1.

- 2. If *N* is invalid, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid k*, and *Invalid k_inverse*.
- 3. requested security strength = the security strength associated with N; see SP 800-57.
- 4. Obtain a string of *N*+64 *returned_bits* from an **RBG** with a security strength of *requested_security_strength* or more. If an **ERROR** status is returned, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid_k*, and *Invalid_k_inverse*.
- 5. Convert *returned bits* to the non-negative integer *c* (see Appendix D.2.1).

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- 6. $k = (c \mod (n-1)) + 1$.
- 7. $(status, k^{-1}) = inverse(k, n).$
- 8. Return *status*, k, and k^{-1} .

B.5.2 Per-Message Secret Number Generation by Testing Candidates

In this method, a random number is obtained and tested to determine that it will produce a value of k in the correct range. If k is out-of-range, another random number is obtained (i.e., the process is iterated until an acceptable value of k is obtained.

The following process or its equivalent may be used to generate a per-message secret number.

Input:

(q, FR, a, b, {SEED}, G, n, h) The domain parameters that are used for this process. n is a prime number, and G is a point on the elliptic curve.

Output:

1. status	The status returned from the key pair generation procedure. The status will indicate SUCCESS or an ERROR .
2. (k, k^{-1})	The generated private and public keys. If an error is encountered during the generation process, invalid values for k and k^{-1} should be returned, as represented by <i>Invalid_k</i> and <i>Invalid_k_inverse</i> in the following specification. k and k^{-1} are integers. k and k^{-1} are integers in the range [1, <i>n</i> -1].

Process:

1. N = len(q).

Comment: Check that *N* is included in Table 1 of Section 6.1.1.

- 2. If *N* is invalid, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid_k*, and *Invalid_k_inverse*.
- 3. *requested_security_strength* = the security strength associated with *N*; see SP 800-57.
- 4. Obtain a string of *N returned_bits* from an **RBG** with a security strength of *requested_security_strength* or more. If an **ERROR** status is returned, then return an **ERROR**, *Invalid_k*, and *Invalid_k_inverse*.
- 5. Convert *returned_bits* to the (non-negative) integer *c* (see Appendix D.2.1).
- 6. If (c > n-2), then go to step 4.
- 7. k = c + 1.
- 8. $(status, k^{-1}) = inverse(k, n).$

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9. Return *status*, k, and k^{-1} .

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APPENDIX C: Timeliness

Establishing the time when a digital signature was generated is often a critical consideration. A signed message that includes the (purported) signing time provides no assurance that the private key was used to sign the message at that time unless the accuracy of the time can be trusted. With the appropriate use of timestamps from a Trusted Timestamp Authority (TTA) and/or verifier-supplied data, the signatory can provide some level of assurance about the time that the message was signed.

C.1 Using Timestamps from a Trusted Timestamp Authority

One method of assuring the time of digital signature generation is by the use of a trusted timestamp authority (TTA) that is trusted by both the signatory and the verifier. At the time that FIPS 186-3 was approved, there was no government standard on timestamps. The discussions in this section are intended to assist the reader in determining exactly what assurances are obtained using different timestamp schemes.

C.1.1 Definitions and Notation

A *trusted timestamp authority* (TTA) is an entity that is trusted to produce timestamp packets. A *timestamp packet* (TSP) is transmitted by a TTA and contains:

- A digital signature (the *timestamp_signature*) that is generated using the TTA's private key, and
- The *timestamped_data* upon which the digital signature is generated.

The timestamped data includes a *timestamp*—an accurate, unambiguous representation of the time of generation of the accompanying timestamp signature.

For the purposes of this discussion, the following notation will be used.

1. TSP = timestamp_packet = timestamped_data, timestamp_signature

where the TSP contains both *timestamped_data* and a *timestamp_signature*, although the exact format of the TSP is not specified herein.

2. *timestamp_signature* = SIG_{TTA}(*timestamped_data*)

where "SIG_{TTA}" is a digital signature operation on the *timestamped_data* using the TTA's private digital signature key.

3. *timestamped_data = user_supplied_info, TTA_supplied_info, timestamp,*

where

a. *user_supplied_info* is information that is provided by an entity when requesting a timestamp from the TTA; the *user_supplied_info* may, in fact, be *Null*. If

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provided, the information is used by the TTA during *timestamp_signature* generation, but need not be transmitted in the timestamp packet returned to the requestor. However, this information must be available to entities that will verify the *timestamp_signature*.

- b. *TTA_supplied_info* is additional information that is used by the TTA during *timestamp_signature* generation; the *TTA_supplied_info* may, in fact, be *Null*. All or part of this information may be omitted from the timestamp packet transmitted by the TTA if the omitted portion(s) can be recreated and used by the entities that will verify the *timestamp_signature*.
- c. *timestamp* contains the time and possibly other information.

Therefore, the generic TSP produced by a TTA has the form:

TSP = user_supplied_info, TTA_supplied_info, timestamp, SIG_{TTA}(user_supplied_info, TTA_supplied_info, timestamp)

where *user_supplied_info* and *TTA_supplied_info* may be *Null*.

C.1.2 Timestamp Provision by a TTA

A TTA may either broadcast a timestamp packet (TSP) or provide a TSP in response to a request from a requesting entity. The requesting entity and any other party that needs to verify the TTA's digital signature (i.e., a relying party) must be aware of the security strength provided by the TTA's digital signature. If an *X*-bit security strength is required by the requesting entity's or relying party's application, then the TTA's digital signature **shall** provide at least *X*-bits of security strength in order to fulfill that requirement (see SP 800-57).

When a TTA broadcasts a TSP, the *user_supplied_info* in the TSP is *Null*. The *timestamp_signature* is generated on the *TTA-supplied_info* (which may be *Null*) and the *timestamp*. The TSP is then assembled and broadcast. Portions of *the TTA_supplied_info* that are known by all intended recipients of the TSP may be omitted from the *timestamped_data* field of the TSP, even though the *TTA_supplied_info* is included in the data used during the generation and verification of the *timestamp_signature*.

When a TTA provides a TSP in response to a requesting entity, the requesting entity provides *user_supplied_info* (which may be *Null*) to the TTA. The *timestamp_signature* is generated on the *user_supplied_info*, the *TTA-supplied_info* (which may be *Null*), and the *timestamp*. The TSP is assembled and then sent to the requesting entity. Portions of the *TTA-supplied_info* that are known by all intended recipients of the TSP, and the *user_supplied_info* that is otherwise made known to the verifying entity may be omitted from the *timestamped_data* field of the returned TSP, even though they must be included in the data during the generation and verification of the *timestamp_signature*.

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C.1.3 Signatory Provision of a Timestamp with a Signed Message

There are several useful schemes in which an entity A obtains a timestamp packet (TSP) from a trusted timestamp authority (TTA) and then combines the TSP with a message (M) and a signature into a payload of data (D) that is sent to recipient entity B.

In the following schemes, signatures are generated by entity A or a TTA using an Approved digital signature algorithm. Let $SIG_A()$ be a signature generated by entity A, and let $SIG_{TTA}()$ be a signature generated by a TTA. $SIG_A()$ is verified using entity A's public signature verification key, and $SIG_{TTA}()$ is verified using the TTA's public signature verification key. The following discussions assume that entity B successfully verifies <u>all</u> received signatures.

C.1.3.1 Optional (or No) User Information Provided to the TTA

As shown in Figure C-1, entity A may request a *timestamp* from a TTA, or entity A may use a *timestamp* that is broadcast from a TTA (i.e., entity A does not explicitly request a timestamp from the TTA).

1. The Request message in Figure C-1 is sent only if entity A explicitly requests a timestamp from the TTA. If the request is sent, the Request message contains any desired *user_supplied_info* (see Appendix C.1.1).




Figure C-1: No User Info Provided to the TTA

2. The TTA sends a TSP to entity A (or broadcasts a TSP that is obtained by A), where:

 $TSP = timestamped_data, timestamp_signature_{TTA}$.

If a Request message was sent (in step 1):

timestamped data = user supplied info, TTA-supplied info, timestamp.

 $timestamp_signature_{TTA} = SIG_{TTA}(user_supplied_info, TTA_supplied_info, timestamp).$

If a Request message was not sent (in step 1):

timestamped_data = TTA_supplied_info, timestamp.

 $timestamp_signature_{TTA} = SIG_{TTA}(TTA_supplied_info, timestamp),$

i.e., user_supplied_info must be Null in the case of a broadcast TSP.

If there is a mutual agreement between entity A and the TTA, the following information

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may be omitted from the TSP data that is transmitted by the TTA:

- The user_supplied_info may be omitted, since it is known by entity A.
- The *TTA_supplied_info* may be omitted when this information is known by entity A.

However, any such information omitted from the <u>transmitted</u> data **shall** be included in the *timestamped_data* that is used in the generation / verification of *timestamp_signature*_{TTA} = $SIG_{TTA}(timestamped_data)$.

3. Entity A signs (M, TSP), assembles D and sends it to entity B:

D = M, TSP, SIG_A(M, TSP),

where the TSP is as specified in step 2.

If there is a mutual agreement between entity A and entity B, the *user_supplied_info* and/or *TTA_supplied_info* may be omitted from the <u>transmitted</u> TSP data if this information is already known by entity B. However, the *user_supplied_info* (if applicable) and the *TTA_supplied_info* shall be included in the *timestamped_data* that is used in the generation / verification of *timestamp_signature*_{TTA} and SIG_A(*M*, TSP).

- 4. Upon receiving *D*, entity B does the following:
 - Verifies *timestamp_signature*_{TTA} using the TTA's public signature verification key, and
 - Verifies $SIG_A(M, TSP)$ using entity A's public signature verification key.

Note that it is irrelevant which of these steps is performed first; it is only important that both verifications are successful.

Entity B knows the following:

- a. *M* could have been assembled either before or after the TSP was received.
- b. $SIG_A(M, TSP)$ was generated at some point after the time indicated by the *timestamp* in the TSP.
- c. *D* was assembled after the time indicated by the *timestamp* in the TSP.

If a more precise time is required for the generation of $SIG_A(M, TSP)$, a second trusted timestamp may be acquired (as specified in Appendix C.1.4) that will provide assurance that (M, TSP) had existed and been signed by (at least) the time indicated in the second timestamp.

C.1.3.2 A Hash of *M* is Provided to the TTA

Entity A may provide the hash value of M to the TTA when requesting a timestamp as shown in Figure C-2. Let H(M) denote a hash value of M using an Approved hash function.

1. Entity A sends H(M) to the TTA in a timestamp request, i.e., *user_supplied_info* = H(M).

2. The TTA returns a TSP to entity A:

 $TSP = timestamped_data, timestamp_signature_{TTA}$

where:

timestamped data = H(M), TTA-supplied info, timestamp.

 $timestamp_signature_{TTA} = SIG_{TTA}(H(M), TTA_supplied_info, timestamp).$

If there is a mutual agreement between entity A and the TTA, the following information may be omitted from the TSP data that is <u>transmitted</u> by the TTA:

- H(*M*) may be omitted, since it is known by entity A.
- The *TTA_supplied_info* may be omitted if this information is already known by entity A.




Figure C-2: Entity A Provides a Hash Value to the TTA

However, even though they may be omitted from the <u>transmitted</u> data,

H(*M*) and the *TTA_supplied_info* shall both be included in the *timestamped_data* that is used in the generation / verification of

 $timestamp_signature_{TTA} = SIG_{TTA}(timestamped_data).$

3. Entity A signs (M, TSP), assembles D and sends it to entity B:

D = M, TSP, SIG_A(M, TSP)

where the TSP is as defined in step 2.

If there is a mutual agreement between entity A and entity B, the following information may be omitted from the TSP data <u>transmitted</u> in *D* by entity A:

- H(M) may be omitted, since H(M) can be (re)calculated by entity B.
- *TTA_supplied_info* may be omitted if the information is already known by entity B.

However, H(*M*) and the *TTA_supplied_info* **shall** both be included in the *timestamped_data* that is used in the generation / verification of *timestamp_signature*_{TTA} and SIG_A(*M*, TSP).

- 4. Upon receiving *D*, entity B does the following:
 - Computes H(M)'. If H(M) was received in D (see step 3), then entity B also

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verifies that H(M)' = H(M).

- Verifies *timestamp_signature*_{TTA} using the TTA's public signature verification key, and
- Verifies $SIG_A(M, TSP)$ using entity A's public signature verification key.

Note that it is irrelevant which signature verification is performed first; it is only important that both verifications are successful.

Entity B knows the following:

- 1. *M* was assembled, and H(M) was generated prior to the time indicated by the timestamp in the TSP obtained from the TTA; in particular, H(M) was included in the *timestamped data* that was signed by the TTA.
- 2. *M* has remained unchanged since the time indicated by the *timestamp* in the TSP.
- 3. SIG_A(M, TSP) was generated at some point after the time indicated by the *timestamp* in the TSP.
- 4. *D* was assembled after the time indicated by the *timestamp* in the TSP.

If a more precise time is required for the generation of $SIG_A(M, TSP)$, a second trusted timestamp may be acquired (as specified in Appendix C.1.4) that will provide assurance that (M, TSP) had been signed by (at least) the time indicated in the second timestamp.

C.1.3.3 A Digital Signature on *M* is Provided to the TTA

Entity A may provide the digital signature of M to the TTA when requesting a timestamp as shown in Figure C-3.

- Entity A sends SIG_A(M) to the TTA in a timestamp request, i.e., user_supplied_info = SIG_A(M).
- 2. The TTA returns a TSP to entity A:


```
TSP = timestamped_data,
timestamp_signature<sub>TTA</sub>
```


where:

timestamped data = $SIG_A(M)$, TTA supplied info, timestamp.

 $timestamp_signature_{TTA} = SIG_{TTA}(SIG_A(M), TTA_supplied_info, timestamp).$

If there is a mutual agreement between entity A and the TTA, the following information may be omitted from the TSP <u>transmitted</u> by entity A:





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- $SIG_A(M)$ may be omitted, since it is known by entity A.
- The *TTA_supplied_info* may be omitted when this information is known by entity A.

However, $SIG_A(M)$ and the *TTA_supplied_info* shall be included in the generation of *timestamp_signature*_{TTA}.

3. Entity A signs (*M*, TSP), assembles *D* and sends it to entity B:

D = M, TSP, SIG_A(M, TSP)

where TSP is as defined in step 2:

If there is a mutual agreement between entity A and entity B, the *TTA_supplied_info* may be omitted from the transmitted TSP in *D* when this information is known by entity B.

- 4. Upon receiving *D*, entity B does the following:
 - Verifies $SIG_A(M)$ using entity A's public signature verification key,
 - Verifies *timestamp_signature*_{TTA} using the TTA's public signature verification key, and
 - Verifies $SIG_A(M, TSP)$ using entity A's public signature verification key.

Note that the order of performing these steps is irrelevant; it is only important that all verifications are successful.

Entity B knows the following:

- 1. *M* and SIG_{*A*}(*M*) were generated before the time indicated by the TSP's *timestamp*, and SIG_{*A*}(*M*) was included in the *timestamped data* that was signed by the TTA.
- 2. *M* has remained unchanged since the time indicated by the *timestamp* in the TSP.
- 3. SIG_A(M, TSP) was generated at some time after the time indicated by the *timestamp* in the TSP.
- 4. *D* was assembled after the time indicated by the *timestamp* in the TSP.

If a more precise time is required for the generation of $SIG_A(M, TSP)$, a second trusted timestamp may be acquired (as specified in Appendix C.1.4) that will provide assurance that $SIG_A(M, TSP)$ was generated by (at least) the time indicated in the second timestamp.

C.1.4 Using an Additional Timestamp

A refinement of the signature generation time may be obtained if a second timestamp is requested from a TTA. Any entity could make the request, although requests by entity A and entity B are discussed below. This procedure has the most value if the timestamp request is made as close as possible to the generation of entity A's signature on the first timestamp packet; thus, a

minimal time interval is established during which the signature was generated. The discussions assume that entity B successfully verifies all digital signatures.

In the following schemes, the initial steps of a scheme specified in Appendix C.1.3 are executed first, with the following changes:

- user supplied info becomes user supplied info₁,
- *TTA supplied info* becomes *TTA supplied info*₁,
- *timestamp* becomes *timestamp*₁,
- TTA becomes TTA₁ (alternatively represented as TTA1 in a subscript), and •
- TSP becomes TSP₁,

C.1.4.1 Entity A Requests the Second Timestamp

Both timestamps may be obtained by entity A. The TTA(s) providing the timestamps must by trusted by both entity A and entity B, and also by any third party that needs to be convinced of the signature generation time.

Figure C-4 shows that the first timestamp is obtained as specified in one of the schemes in Appendix C.1.3, after which entity A requests a second timestamp. The first two steps are the same as those specified for a given scheme in Appendix C.1.3.

The process continues as follows:

3. Entity A generates $SIG_A(M,$ TSP_1) and sends it to TTA_2 in a second timestamp request, i.e., user supplied $info_2 = SIG_A(M, TSP_1)$.

4. TSP, TSP, d ۲. 5. D = M, TSP₁, TSP₂ B A

Figure C-4: After Using a Scheme in C.1.3, Entity A Requests a Second Timestamp


 TSP_1 is defined for each scheme in Appendix C.1.3.

4. TTA_2 returns TSP_2 to entity A:

 $TSP_2 = timestamped data_2$, timestamp signature_{TTA2}

where:

timestamped_data₂ = SIG_A(
$$M$$
, TSP₁), TTA_supplied_info₂, timestamp₂.
timestamp signature_{TTA2} = SIG_{TTA2}(SIG_A(M , TSP₁), TTA supplied info₂



*timestamp*₂).

If there is a mutual agreement between entity A and TTA_2 , the following information may be omitted from the TSP₂ data <u>transmitted</u> by TTA_2 :

- $SIG_A(M, TSP_1)$ may be omitted, since it is known by entity A.
- *TTA_supplied_info*₂ may be omitted when the information is known by entity A.

However, even though they may be omitted from the <u>transmitted</u> TSP₂ data, both SIG_A(M, TSP₁) and the *TTA_supplied_info*₂ **shall** be included in the *timestamped_data*₂ that is used in the generation / verification of *timestamp_signature*_{TTA2} = SIG_{TTA2} (*timestamped_data*₂).

5. Entity A assembles *D* and sends it to entity B:

D = M, TSP₁, TSP₂

where TSP_1 is defined in the appropriate subsection of Section C.1.3, and TSP_2 is as defined in step 4.

If there is a mutual agreement between entity A and entity B, the following may be omitted from the <u>transmitted</u> TSP_1 and TSP_2 data in D:

- Any *user_supplied_info*₁ that is present in TSP₁ may be omitted if it is known or can be determined by entity B.
- The *TTA_supplied_info*₁ that is present in TSP₁ may be omitted if it is already known by entity B.
- *TTA supplied info*₂ may be omitted if it is already known by entity B.

However, any such information omitted from the <u>transmitted</u> data **shall** be included in the appropriate *timestamped_data* field (*timestamped_data*_1 and/or *timestamped_data*_2) used in the generation / verification of the quantities:

 $timestamp_signature_{TTA1} = SIG_{TTA1} (timestamped_data_1),$

 $SIG_A(M, TSP_1)$, and

 $timestamp_signature_{TTA2} = SIG_{TTA1}$ ($timestamped_data_2$).

- 6. Upon receiving D, entity B does the following:
 - If the scheme in Appendix C.1.3.2 was used, entity B computes H(M)'. If H(M) was received by entity B in *D*, entity B also verifies that H(M)' = H(M).
 - Verifies *timestamp signature*_{TTA1} using TTA₁'s public signature verification key,
 - Verifies $SIG_A(M, TSP_1)$ using entity A's public signature verification key, and
 - Verifies *timestamp signature*_{TTA2} using TTA₂'s public signature verification key.

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Note that the order of performing these verifications is irrelevant; it is only important that all verifications are successful.

Entity B knows the following in addition to what is known in the appropriate scheme from Appendix C.1.3:

- a. SIG_A(*M*, TSP₁) was generated between the times indicated in *timestamp*₁ and *timestamp*₂, and was included in the *timestamped_data* signed by TTA₂.
- b. *D* was assembled after the time indicated by *timestamp*₂.

C.1.4.2 Entity B Requests the Second Timestamp

Entity B may request a second timestamp after receiving and verifying the message Dfrom entity A (see step 4 of the schemes in Appendix C.1.3). The TTA that provides the first timestamp must be trusted by both entity A and entity B, but the TTA that provides the second timestamp (TTA₂) may




Figure C-5: Entity A Used a Scheme from C.1.3; Entity B Requests the Second Timestamp

need to be trusted only by entity B. In general, any party that relies on the accuracy of the bounds on the generation time of $SIG_A(M, TSP_1)$ must trust both TTAs.

Figure C-5 shows entity B requesting a second timestamp after receiving the message D from entity A. The first four steps of this scheme are the same as those specified in one of the schemes in Appendix C.1.3.

After verifying the signatures in D (in step 4), the scheme proceeds as follows:

5. Entity B sends entity A's digital signature from *D* as the *user_supplied_info*₂ to TTA₂ in a timestamp request (shown as message 4 in Figure C-5), where:

 $user_supplied_info_2 = SIG_A (M, TSP_1).$

6. TTA₂ returns TSP₂ to entity B (shown as message 5 in Figure C-5):

 $TSP_2 = timestamped_data_2$, $timestamp_signature_{TTA2}$

where:

 $timestamped_data_2 = SIG_A (M, TSP_1), TTA_supplied_info_2, timestamp_2$ $timestamp_signature_{TTA2} = SIG_{TTA2}(SIG_A (M, TSP_1), TTA_supplied_info_2, timestamp_2).$

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If there is a mutual agreement between entity B and TTA_2 , the following information may be omitted from the TSP₂ data <u>transmitted</u> by TTA_2 :

- $SIG_A(M, TSP_1)$ may be omitted, since it is known by entity B.
- *TTA_supplied_info*₂ may be omitted if the information is already known by entity B.

However, even though they may be omitted from the <u>transmitted</u> TSP₂ data, both SIG_A(M, TSP₁) and the *TTA_supplied_info*₂ **shall** be included in the *timestamped_data*₂ that is used in the generation / verification of *timestamp_signature*_{TTA2} = SIG_{TTA2} (*timestamped_data*₂).

7. Entity B then verifies *timestamp_signature*_{TTA2} using TTA_2 's public signature verification key.

In addition to what is known from each scheme, entity B now has proof that the signature $SIG_A(M, TSP_1)$ was generated between the times indicated in *timestamp*₁ and *timestamp*₂.

C.2 Evidence of Timeliness Using Verifier-Supplied Data

Independent of the use of a trusted timestamping service by entity A, entity A can provide evidence to the verifier (entity B) of the timeliness of its signature by:

- Combining fresh data that was supplied by the intended verifier with any other data to be included in the message, and
- Generating a digital signature on the combination.

Let *Nonce* be the verifier-supplied data (i.e., suppled by entity B) with entropy at least equal to the security strength of the private signature key. Let *D* be the signed message to be sent to entity B, and let $SIG_A()$ be the digital signature that is computed by entity A using an Approved hash function and an Approved signature algorithm; $SIG_A()$ is verified using entity A's public signature verification key. The discussions assume that entity B successfully verifies <u>all</u> digital signatures.

C.2.1 The Basic Scheme

As shown in Figure C-6, the scheme proceeds as follows:

1. Entity B sends a newly generated *Nonce* to entity A. The *Nonce* must be unpredictable by entity A prior to its receipt. For example, the *Nonce* could be some combination of a trusted

$$\mathbf{A} \underbrace{2. D = M, \operatorname{SIG}_{A}(M, \operatorname{Nonce})}_{\text{B}} \mathbf{B}$$

timestamp (supplied by entity B) and a random number with entropy at least as great as

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the security strength associated with the digital signature.

2. Entity A signs (*M*, *Nonce*), assembles *D*, and sends it to entity B, where:

D = M, SIG_A(M, Nonce).

3. Upon receiving D, entity B then verifies $SIG_A(M, Nonce)$ using entity A's public signature verification key.

Entity B knows the following:

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- a. *M* could have been assembled either before or after the *Nonce* was received from entity B.
- b. $SIG_A(M, Nonce)$ was generated at some time after the Nonce was received by entity A.
- c. D was assembled by entity A after the *Nonce* was received.

If a more precise time is required for the generation of $SIG_A(M, Nonce)$, a trusted timestamp may be acquired as specified in Appendix C.2.2; the timestamp will provide assurance that $SIG_A(M, M)$ *Nonce*) was generated by (at least) the time indicated in the timestamp.

C.2.2 Using a Timestamp to Obtain More Precision

When verifier-supplied data is used, a more precise time for the generation of a digital signature can be provided by requesting a timestamp. Any entity could make the request, although requests by entity A and entity B are discussed below. This procedure has the most value if the timestamp request is made as close to the generation of entity A's signature as possible, since it may be

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used to establish a minimal time interval during which entity A's signature was generated. The discussions assume that entity B successfully verifies all digital signatures.

C.2.2.1 Entity A Requests the Timestamp

Entity A may request a timestamp before sending a message to entity B. The TTA that provides the timestamp must be trusted by both parties.

Figure C-7 depicts the case where entity A provides more precision as to when $SIG_A(M, M)$ Nonce) was generated. Note that the Nonce supplied by entity B could include a timestamp, in which case, this (additional) timestamp could establish an interval during which $SIG_A(M, M)$ Nonce) was generated.

The first step is the same as that specified in Appendix C.2.1. The process continues as




Figure C-7: Entity A Requests a Timestamp

- follows:
 - 2. Entity A generates $SIG_A(M, Nonce)$ and sends it to the TTA in a timestamp request, where *user_supplied_info* = $SIG_A(M, Nonce)$.
 - 3. The TTA returns a TSP to entity A:

 $TSP = timestamped_data, timestamp_signature_{TTA}$

where:

timestamped_data = $SIG_A(M, Nonce)$, *TTA_supplied_info*, *timestamp*.

 $timestamp_signature_{TTA} = SIG_{TTA}(SIG_A(M, Nonce), TTA_supplied_info, timestamp).$

If there is a mutual agreement between entity A and the TTA, the following information may be omitted from the TSP data <u>transmitted</u> by the TTA:

- $SIG_A(M, Nonce)$ may be omitted, since it is known by entity A.
- *TTA_supplied_info* may be omitted if this information is already known by entity A.

However, even though they may be omitted from the <u>transmitted</u> TSP data, both $SIG_A(M, Nonce)$ and the *TTA_supplied_info* **shall** be included in the *timestamped_data* that is used in the generation / verification of *timestamp signature*_{TTA} = $SIG_{TTA}(timestamped data)$.

4. Entity A assembles *D* and sends it to entity B:

D = M, TSP

where TSP is as defined in step 3.

If there is a mutual agreement between entity A and entity B, the *TTA_supplied_info* may be omitted from the TSP data <u>transmitted</u> by entity A – provided that it is already known by entity B. However, the *TTA_supplied_info* **shall** be included in the *timestamped_data* that is used in the generation / verification of *timestamp signature*_{TTA}.

- 5. Upon receiving *D*, entity B does the following:
 - Verifies $SIG_A(M, Nonce)$ using entity A's verification public key, and
 - Verifies *timestamp_signature*_{TTA} using the TTA's public signature verification key.

Note that the order of performing these verifications is irrelevant; it is only important that both verifications are successful.

In addition to what has been determined by entity B in Appendix C.2.1, entity B now has determined that $SIG_A(M, Nonce)$ was generated between the time that the *Nonce* was sent to entity A and the time indicated in the timestamp

C.2.2.2 Entity B Requests the Timestamp

Entity B may request a timestamp after receiving the message D from entity A. The TTA that provides the timestamp may need to be trusted only by entity B unless a third party needs to be convinced of the signature generation time.

Figure C-8 depicts the case where entity A provides evidence of timeliness using data supplied by entity B, and entity B determines (more precisely) when the digital signature generated by entity A was received. Note that the *Nonce* supplied by entity B could include a timestamp (trusted by both entity A and entity B), in which case, this (additional) timestamp would establish an interval during which the signature was generated. $\mathbf{A} \underbrace{\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{D} = M, \operatorname{SIG}_{A}(M, Nonce) \end{array}^{\mathsf{TTA}}}_{2. D = M, \operatorname{SIG}_{A}(M, Nonce)} \mathbf{B}$

Figure C-8: Entity B Requests a Timestamp

The first three steps are the same as those specified in Appendix C.2.1. After verifying the signature in *D*, the scheme proceeds as follows:

4. Entity B sends SIG_A(*M*, *Nonce*) as the *user_supplied_info* to the TTA in a timestamp request (shown as message 3 in Figure C-8); therefore,

 $user_supplied_info = SIG_A(M, Nonce).$

5. The TTA returns a TSP to entity B (shown as message 4 in Figure C-8):

 $TSP = timestamped_data, timestamp_signature_{TTA}$

where:

timestamped_data = SIG_A(*M*, *Nonce*), *TTA_supplied_info*, *timestamp*

 $timestamp_signature_{TTA} = SIG_{TTA}(SIG_A(M, Nonce), TTA_supplied_info, timestamp).$

If there is a mutual agreement between entity B and the TTA, the following information may be omitted from the TSP data <u>transmitted</u> by the TTA:

- $SIG_A(M, Nonce)$ may be omitted, since it is known by entity B.
- *TTA_supplied_info* may be omitted when this information is known by entity B.

However, even though they may be omitted from the <u>transmitted</u> TSP data, both $SIG_A(M, Nonce)$ and the *TTA_supplied_info* **shall** be included in the *timestamped_data* that is used in the generation / verification of *timestamp_signature*_{TTA} = $SIG_{TTA}(timestamped_data)$.

6. Entity B then verifies *timestamp_signature*_{TTA} using the TTA's public signature verification key.

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In addition to what has been determined by Entity B in Appendix C.2.1, entity B has proof that $timestamp_signature_{TTA}$ was generated before the time indicated in the *timestamp*.

Appendix D: Generation of Other Quantities

This appendix contains routines for supplementary processes required for the implementation of this Standard. Appendix D.1 is needed to produce the inverse of the per-message secret k (see Section 4.5) and the inverse of the signature portion s that is used during signature verification (see Section 4.7). The routines in Appendix D.2 are required to convert between bit strings and integers where required in implementing this Standard. Appendix D.3 provides a process to perform trial division, as required by the random prime generation routine in Appendix A.1.2.3. The sieve procedure in Appendix D.4 is needed by the trial division routine in Appendix D.3. The trial division process in Appendix D.3 and the sieve procedure in Appendix D.4 have been extracted from ANS X9.80, *Prime Number Generation, Primality Testing, and Primality Certificates*. Appendices D.5 – D.7 are required during the generation of RSA key pairs.

D.1 Computation of the Inverse Value

This algorithm or an algorithm that produces an equivalent result **shall** be used to compute the multiplicative inverse $z^{-1} \mod a$, where $0 \le z \le a$, $0 \le z^{-1} \le a$, and *a* is a prime number. In this Standard, *z* is either *k* or *s*, and *a* is either *q* or *n*.

Input:

1.	Ζ	The value to be inverted mod a (i.e., either k or s).
2.	a	The domain parameter and (prime) modulus (i.e., either q or n).
Outpu	ıt:	
1.	status	The status returned from this function, where the <i>status</i> is either SUCCESS or ERROR .

2. z^{-1} The multiplicative inverse of $z \mod a$, if it exists.

Process:

- 1. Verify that a and z are positive integers such that z < a; if not, return an **ERRO**R.
- 2. Set $i = a, j = z, x_2 = 1, x_1 = 0, y_2 = 0$, and $y_1 = 1$.
- 3. quotient = $\lfloor i/j \rfloor$.
- 4. remainder = $i (j \bullet quotient)$.
- 5. $x = x_2 (x_1 \bullet quotient)$.
- 6. $y = y_2 (y_1 \bullet quotient)$.
- 7. Set $i = j, j = remainder, x_2 = x_1, x_1 = x, y_2 = y_1$, and $y_1 = y$.

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- 8. If (j > 0), then go to step 3.
- 9. If $(i \neq 1)$, then return an **ERRO**R.
- 10. Return **SUCCESS** and y_2 .

D.2 Conversion Between Bit Strings and Integers

D.2.1 Conversion of a Bit String to an Integer

A *j*-long sequence of bits $\{x_1, ..., x_j\}$ is converted to an integer by the rule

$$\{x_1, ..., x_j\} \to (x_1 * 2^{j-1}) + (x_2 * 2^{j-2}) + ... + (x_{j-1} * 2) + x_j.$$

Note that the first bit of a sequence corresponds to the most significant bit of the corresponding integer, and the last bit corresponds to the least significant bit.

Input:

1. $b_1, b_2, ..., b_n$ The bit string to be converted.

Output:

1. *C* The requested integer representation of the bit string.

Process:

1. Let $(b_1, b_2, ..., b_n)$ be the bits of *b* from leftmost to rightmost.

2.
$$C = \sum_{i=1}^{n} 2^{(n-i)} b_i$$

3. Return C.

In this Standard, the binary length of an integer *C* is defined as the smallest integer *n* satisfying $C < 2^n$.

D.2.2 Conversion of an Integer to a Bit String

An integer x in the range $0 \le x < 2^j$ may be converted to a *j*-long sequence of bits by using its binary expansion as shown below:

$$x = (x_1 * 2^{j-1}) + (x_2 * 2^{j-2}) + \dots + (x_{j-1} * 2) + x_j \to \{x_1, \dots, x_j\}$$

Note that the first bit of a sequence corresponds to the most significant bit of the corresponding integer, and the last bit corresponds to the least significant bit.

Input:

1. *C* The non-negative integer to be converted.

Output:

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1. $b_1, b_2, ..., b_n$ The bit string representation of the integer C.

Process:

- 1. Let $(b_1, b_2, ..., b_n)$ represent the bit string, where $b_1 = 0$ or 1, and b_1 is the most significant bit, while b_n is the least significant bit.
- 2. For any integer *n* that satisfies $C < 2^n$, the bits b_i shall satisfy:

$$C = \sum_{i=1}^{n} 2^{(n-1)} b_i$$

3. Return $b_1, b_2, ..., b_n$.

In this Standard, the binary length of the integer *C* is defined as the smallest integer *n* that satisfies $C < 2^n$.

D.3 Trial Division

An integer is proven to be prime by showing that it has no prime factors less than or equal to its square root. This procedure is not recommended for testing any integers longer than 10 digits.

To prove that *c* is prime:

- 1. Prepare a table of primes less than \sqrt{c} . This can be done by applying the sieve procedure in Appendix D.4.
- 2. Divide *c* by every prime in the table. If *c* is divisible by one of the primes, then declare that *c* is composite and exit. If convenient, *c* may be divided by composite numbers. For example, rather than preparing a table of primes, it might be more convenient to divide by all integers except those divisible by 3 or 5.
- 3. Otherwise, declare that *c* is prime and exit.

D.4 Sieve Procedure

A *sieve procedure* is described as follows: Given a sequence of integers Y_0 , $Y_0 + 1$, ..., $Y_0 + J$, a sieve will identify the integers in the sequence that are divisible by primes up to some selected limit.

Note that the definitions of the mathematical symbols in this process (e.g., h, L, M, p) are internal to this process only, and should not be confused with their use elsewhere in this Standard.

Start by selecting a *factor base* of all the primes p_j , from 2 up to some selected limit *L*. The value of *L* is arbitrary and may be determined by computer limitations. A good, typical value of *L* would be anywhere from 10^3 to 10^5 .

- 1. Compute $S_j = Y_0 \mod p_j$ for all p_j in the factor base.
- 2. Initialize an array of length J + 1 to zero.
- 3. Starting at $Y_0 S_j + p_j$, let every p_j^{th} element of the array be set to 1. Do this for the entire length of the array and for every *j*.
- 4. When finished, every location in the array that has the value 1 is divisible by some small prime, and is therefore a composite.

The array can be either a bit array for compactness when memory is small, or a byte array for speed when memory is readily available. There is no need to sieve the entire sieve interval at once. The array can be partitioned into suitably small pieces, sieving each piece before going on to the next piece. When finished, every location with the value 0 is a candidate for prime testing.

The amount of work for this procedure is approximately $M \log \log L$, where M is the length of the sieve interval; this is a very efficient procedure for removing composite candidates for primality testing. If $L = 10^5$, the sieve will remove about 96% of all composites.

In some cases, rather than having a set of consecutive integers to sieve, the set of integers to be tested consists of integers lying in an arithmetic progression Y_0 , $Y_0 + h$, $Y_0 + 2h$, ..., $Y_0 + Jh$, where *h* is large and not divisible by any primes in the factor base.

- 1. Select a factor base and initialize an array of length J + 1 to 0.
- 2. Compute $S_j = Y_0 \mod p_j$ for all p_j in the factor base.
- 3. Compute $T_j = h \mod p_j$ and $r = -S_j T_j^{-1} \mod p_j$.
- 4. Starting at $Y_0 + r$, let every p_j^{th} element of the array be set to 1. Do this for the entire length of the array and for every *j*. Note that the position $Y_0 + r$ in the array actually denotes the number $Y_0 + rh$.
- 5. When finished, every location in the array that has the value 1 is divisible by some small prime and is therefore composite.

Note: The prime "2" takes the longest amount of time (M/2) to sieve, since it touches the most locations in the sieve array. An easy optimization is to combine the initialization of the sieve array with the sieving of the prime "2". It is also possible to sieve the prime "3" during initialization. These optimizations can save about 1/3 of the total sieve time.

D.5 Compute a Prime Factor From Two Large Prime Factors

This routine constructs a prime factor p or q using two prime numbers and the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT).

Input:

 r_1 and r_2

Two prime numbers, each between (*security_strength* +21) and (*security_strength* + 40) bits in length.

March 2006 The public verification exponent. е security strength The minimum security strength required for random number generation.

Output:

private prime factor The prime factor of n.

Process:

1. Generate a random number X using an Approved random number generator that supports the security strength, such that $(\sqrt{2})(2^{nlen/2}-1) \le X \le (2^{nlen/2}-1)$.

2.
$$R = ((r_2^{-1} \mod r_1) \times r_2) - ((r_1^{-1} \mod r_2) \times r_1)$$

Comment: Apply the CRT, so that $R \equiv 1 \mod r_1$ and $R \equiv -1 \mod r_2$.

3. $Y = X + ((R - X) \mod r_1 r_2)$. Comment: *Y* is the first integer $\geq X$, such that r_1 is a large prime factor of Y-1, and r_2 is a large prime factor of Y+1.

> Comment: Determine the requested prime number by constructing candidates from a sequence and performing primality tests.

4. i = 0.

5.
$$C = \mathbf{Y} + i \times (r_1 r_2)$$
.

6. If (**GCD** (*C*-1, e) = 1), then

Comment: Use any primality checking technique that includes at least 8 rounds of Miller-Rabin and 1 round of the Lucas test.

- 6.1 (Optional) Check the primality of C using any test. If not prime, go to step 7.
- 6.2 Apply the Miller-Rabin Probabilistic Primality test in Appendix A.1.1.4 to C, setting *iterations* \geq 8. If **COMPOSITE** is returned, go to step 7.
- 6.3 Apply the Lucas Probabilistic Primality test in Appendix D.6 to C. If **COMPOSITE** is returned, go to step 7.
- 6.4 If $(C > (2^{nlen/2} 1))$, then go to step 1.
- 6.5 private prime factor = C.
- 6.6 Return (private prime factor).

7. i = i + 1.

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8. Go to step 5.

Alternatively, steps 6.2 and 6.3 **may** be replaced by a minimum of 50 iterations of the Miller-Rabin test; that is, steps 6.2 and 6.3 may be replaced by:

Apply the Miller-Rabin Probabilistic Primality test in Appendix A.1.1.4 to C, setting *iterations* \geq 50. If **COMPOSITE** is returned, go to step 7.

D.6 (General) Lucas Probabilistic Primality Test

A single round of the Lucas Probabilistic Primality Test is used to test whether a candidate integer C is prime following 8 rounds of the Miller-Rabin probabilistic primality test (see Appendix D.5).

Input:

C The candidate integer to be tested for primality.

Output:

status Where status is either **PROBABLY PRIME** or **COMPOSITE**.

Process:

- 1. Test whether C is an exact square. If so, return (COMPOSITE).
- 2. Find the first *D* in the sequence $\{5, -7, 9, -11, 13, -15, 17, ...\}$ for which the Jacobi symbol $\left(\frac{D}{C}\right) = -1$. See Appendix D.7 for an Approved method to compute the Jacobi Symbol. If $\left(\frac{D}{C}\right) = 0$ for any *D* in the sequence, return (**COMPOSITE**).
- 3. *K*=*C*+1.
- 4. Let $K_r K_{r-1} \dots K_0$ be the binary expansion of K, with $K_r = 1$.
- 5. Set $U_r = 1$ and $V_r = 1$.
- 6. For i = r-1 to 0, do

6.1
$$U_{temp} = U_{i+1} V_{i+1} \mod C$$
.

6.2
$$V_{temp} = \frac{V_{i+1}^2 + DU_{i+1}^2}{2} \mod C.$$

6.3 If
$$(K_i = 1)$$
, then

Comment: If $K_i = 1$, then do steps 6.3.1 and 6.3.2; otherwise, do steps 6.3.3 and 6.3.4.

6.3.1
$$U_i = \frac{U_{temp} + V_{temp}}{2} \mod C.$$

6.3.2 $V_i = \frac{V_{temp} + DU_{temp}}{2} \mod C.$

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Else

6.3.3
$$U_i = U_{temp}$$
.
6.3.4 $V_i = V_{temp}$.

7. If $(U_0=0)$, then return (**PROBABLY PRIME**). Otherwise, return (**COMPOSITE**).

Steps 6.2, 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 contain expressions of the form $A/2 \mod C$, where A is an integer, and C is an odd integer. If A/2 is not an integer (i.e., A is odd), then $A/2 \mod C$ may be calculated as $(A+C)/2 \mod C$. Alternatively, $A/2 \mod C = A \cdot (C+1)/2 \mod C$, for any integer A, without regard to A being odd or even.

D.7 Jacobi Symbol Algorithm

This routine computes the Jacobi symbol $\left(\frac{a}{n}\right)$.

Jacobi ():

Input:

- *a* Any integer. For this Standard, the integer is in the sequence $\{5, -7, 9, -11, 13, -15, 17, ...\}$ as determined by Appendix D.6.
- *n* Any integer. For this Standard, the integer is the candidate being tested, as determined by Appendix D.6.

Output:

result The calculated Jacobi symbol.

Process:

- 1. $a = a \mod n$. Comment: *a* will be in the range $0 \le a < n$.
- 2. If a = 1, or n = 1, then return (1).
- 3. If a = 0, then return (0).
- 4. Define *e* and a_1 such that $a = 2^e a_1$, where a_1 is odd.
- 5. If *e* is even, then s = 1.

Else if $((n \equiv 1 \pmod{8}))$ or $(n \equiv 7 \pmod{8}))$, then s = 1.

Else if $((n \equiv 3 \pmod{8}))$ or $(n \equiv 5 \pmod{8})$, then s = -1.

6. If $((n \equiv 3 \pmod{4}))$ and $(a_1 \equiv 3 \pmod{4}))$, then s = -s.

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- 7. $n_1 = n \mod a_1$.
- 8. Return ($s \cdot \text{Jacobi}(n_1, a_1)$). Comment: Call this routine recursively.

Example: Compute the Jacobi symbol for a = 5 and n = 3439601197:

- 1. *n* is not 1, and *a* is not 1, so proceed to Step 2.
- 2. *a* is not 0, so proceed to Step 3.
- 3. $5 = 2^0 * 5$, so e = 0, and $a_1 = 5$.
- 4. e is even, so s = 1.
- 5. a_1 is not congruent to 3 mod 4, so do not change *s*.
- 6. $n_1 = 2 = n \mod 5$.
- 7. Compute and return (1 * Jacobi(2, 5)). This calls Jacobi recursively. Compute the Jacobi symbol for a = 2 and n = 5:
 - 7.1 n is not 1, and a is not 1, so proceed to Step 7.2.
 - 7.2 a is not 0, so proceed to Step 7.3.
 - 7.3 $2 = 2^1 * 1$, so e = 1, and $a_1 = 1$.
 - 7.4 *e* is odd, and $n \equiv 5 \mod 8$, so set s = -1.
 - 7.5 n is not 3 mod 4, and a_1 is not 3 mod 4, so proceed to step 7.6.
 - 7.6 $n_1 = 0 = n \mod 1$.
 - 7.7 Return (-1 * Jacobi(0, 1) = -1). This calls Jacobi recursively. Compute the Jacobi symbol for a = 0 and n = 1:

7.7.1 n = 1, so return 1.

Thus, Jacobi (0,1)=1, so Jacobi (2,5)=-1*(1)=-1, and Jacobi (5, 3439601197)=1*(-1)=-1.

Appendix E: Recommended Elliptic Curves for Federal Government Use

This collection of elliptic curves is recommended for Federal government use and contains choices for the private key length and underlying fields. These curves were generated using SHA-1 and the method given in the ANSI X9.62 and IEEE P1363 standards. This appendix describes the process that was used.

E.1 NIST Recommended Elliptic Curves

E.1.1 Choices

E.1.1.1 Choice of Key Lengths

The principal parameters for elliptic curve cryptography are the elliptic curve E and a designated point G on E called the *base point*. The base point has order n, a large prime. The number of points on the curve is hn for some integer h (the *cofactor*) not divisible by n. For efficiency reasons, it is desirable to have the cofactor be as small as possible.

All of the curves given below have cofactors 1, 2, or 4. As a result, the private and public keys for a curve are approximately the same length.

E.1.1.2 Choice of Underlying Fields

For each cryptovariable length, two kinds of fields are provided.

- A *prime field* is the field GF(p), which contains a prime number p of elements. The elements of this field are the integers modulo p, and the field arithmetic is implemented in terms of the arithmetic of integers modulo p.
- A *binary field* is the field $GF(2^m)$, which contains 2^m elements for some *m* (called the *degree* of the field). The elements of this field are the bit strings of length *m*, and the field arithmetic is implemented in terms of operations on the bits.

The security strengths for five ranges of the bit length of *n* is provided in SP 800-57. For the field GF(p), the security strength is dependent on the length of the binary expansion of *p*. For the field $GF(2^m)$, the security strength is dependent on the value of *m*. Table E-1 provides the bit lengths of the various underlying fields of the curves provided in this appendix. Column 1 lists the ranges for the bit length of *n* (also see Table 1 in Section 6.1.1). Column 2 identifies the value of *p* used for the curves over prime fields, where **len**(*p*) is the length of the binary expansion of the integer *p*. Column 3 provides the value of *m* for the curves over binary fields.

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Bit Length of <i>n</i>	Prime Field	Binary Field
161 – 223	len (<i>p</i>) = 192	<i>m</i> = 163
224 - 255	$\mathbf{len}(p) = 224$	<i>m</i> = 233
256 - 383	$\mathbf{len}(p) = 256$	<i>m</i> = 283
384 - 511	$\mathbf{len}(p) = 384$	<i>m</i> = 409
≥ 512	$\mathbf{len}(p) = 521$	<i>m</i> = 571

 Table E-1: Title

E.1.1.3 Choice of Basis

To describe the arithmetic of a binary field, it is first necessary to specify how a bit string is to be interpreted. This is referred to as choosing a *basis* for the field. There are two common types of bases: a *polynomial basis* and a *normal basis*.

• A polynomial basis is specified by an irreducible polynomial modulo 2, called the *field* polynomial. The bit string $(a_{m-1} \dots a_2 a_1 a_0)$ is taken to represent the polynomial

$$a_{m-1}t^{m-1} + \ldots + a_2t^2 + a_1t + a_0$$

over GF(2). The field arithmetic is implemented as polynomial arithmetic modulo p(t), where p(t) is the field polynomial.

• A normal basis is specified by an element θ of a particular kind. The bit string $(a_0 \ a_1 \ a_2 \ \dots \ a_{m-1})$ is taken to represent the element

$$a_0\theta + a_1\theta^2 + a_2\theta^{2^2} + a_{m-1}\theta^{2^{m-1}}$$
.

Normal basis field arithmetic is not easy to describe or efficient to implement in general, except for a special class called *Type T low-complexity* normal bases. For a given field degree *m*, the choice of *T* specifies the basis and the field arithmetic (see Appendix E.3).

There are many polynomial bases and normal bases from which to choose. The following procedures are commonly used to select a basis representation.

- Polynomial Basis: If an irreducible trinomial $t^m + t^k + 1$ exists over GF (2), then the field polynomial p(t) is chosen to be the irreducible trinomial with the lowest-degree middle term t^k . If no irreducible trinomial exists, then a pentanomial $t^m + t^a + t^b + t^c + 1$ is selected. The particular pentanomial chosen has the following properties: the second term t^a has the lowest degree m; the third term t^b has the lowest degree among all irreducible pentanomials of degree m and second term t^a ; and the fourth term t^c has the lowest degree among all irreducible pentanomials of degree m, second term t^a , and third term t^b .
- *Normal Basis*: Choose the Type T low-complexity normal basis with the smallest *T*.

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For each binary field, the parameters are given for the above basis representations.

E.1.1.4 Choice of Curves

Two kinds of curves are given:

- *Pseudo-random* curves are those whose coefficients are generated from the output of a seeded cryptographic hash function. If the (domain parameter) seed value is given along with the coefficients, it can be verified easily that the coefficients were generated by that method.
- *Special curves* whose coefficients and underlying field have been selected to optimize the efficiency of the elliptic curve operations.

For each curve size range, the following curves are given:

- \rightarrow A pseudo-random curve over *GF*(*p*).
- \rightarrow A pseudo-random curve over $GF(2^m)$.
- \rightarrow A special curve over $GF(2^m)$ called a *Koblitz curve* or *anomalous binary curve*.

The pseudo-random curves were generated via the SHA-1 based method given in the ANSI X9.62 and IEEE P1363 standards.

E.1.1.5 Choice of Base Points

Any point of order *n* can serve as the base point. Each curve is supplied with a sample base point $G = (G_x, G_y)$. Users may want to generate their own base points to ensure cryptographic separation of networks.

E.1.2 Curves over Prime Fields

For each prime *p*, a pseudo-random curve

$$E: y^2 \equiv x^3 - 3x + b \pmod{p}$$

of prime order *n* is listed². (Thus, for these curves, the cofactor is always f = 1.) The following parameters are given:

- The prime modulus *p*
- The order *n*
- The 160-bit input seed *SEED* to the SHA-1 based algorithm (i.e., the domain parameter seed)
- The output *c* of the SHA-1 based algorithm

² The selection $a \equiv -3$ for the coefficient of x was made for reasons of efficiency; see IEEE P1363.

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- The coefficient *b* (satisfying $b^2 c \equiv -27 \pmod{p}$)
- The base point *x* coordinate G_x
- The base point y coordinate G_y

The integers p and n are given in decimal form; bit strings and field elements are given in hexadecimal.

E.1.2.1 Curve P-192

p = 6277101735386680763835789423207666416083908700390324961279n = 6277101735386680763835789423176059013767194773182842284081

SEED = 3045ae6f c8422f64 ed579528 d38120ea e12196d5

- c = 3099d2bb bfcb2538 542dcd5f b078b6ef 5f3d6fe2 c745de65
- *b* = 64210519 e59c80e7 0fa7e9ab 72243049 feb8deec c146b9b1
- $G_x =$ 188da80e b03090f6 7cbf20eb 43a18800 f4ff0afd 82ff1012
- $G_{y} = 07192b95$ ffc8da78 631011ed 6b24cdd5 73f977a1 1e794811

E.1.2.2 Curve P-224

- *p* = 2695994666715063979466701508701963067355791626002630814351 0066298881
- *n* = 2695994666715063979466701508701962594045780771442439172168 2722368061

SEED = bd713447 99d5c7fc dc45b59f a3b9ab8f 6a948bc5

- c = 5b056c7e 11dd68f4 0469ee7f 3c7a7d74 f7d12111 6506d031 218291fb
- *b* = b4050a85 0c04b3ab f5413256 5044b0b7 d7bfd8ba 270b3943 2355ffb4
- G_x = b70e0cbd 6bb4bf7f 321390b9 4a03c1d3 56c21122 343280d6
 115c1d21
- G_y = bd376388 b5f723fb 4c22dfe6 cd4375a0 5a074764 44d58199 85007e34
- E.1.2.3 Curve P-256

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- p = 115792089210356248762697446949407573530086143415290314195533631308867097853951
- n = 115792089210356248762697446949407573529996955224135760342422259061068512044369
- SEED = c49d3608 86e70493 6a6678e1 139d26b7 819f7e90
- c = 7efba166 2985be94 03cb055c 75d4f7e0 ce8d84a9 c5114abc
 af317768 0104fa0d
- b = 5ac635d8 aa3a93e7 b3ebbd55 769886bc 651d06b0 cc53b0f6
 3bce3c3e 27d2604b
- G_x = 6b17d1f2 e12c4247 f8bce6e5 63a440f2 77037d81 2deb33a0 f4a13945 d898c296
- G_y = 4fe342e2 fe1a7f9b 8ee7eb4a 7c0f9e16 2bce3357 6b315ece cbb64068 37bf51f5

E.1.2.4 Curve P-384

- *p* = 3940200619639447921227904010014361380507973927046544666794 8293404245721771496870329047266088258938001861606973112319
- *n* = 3940200619639447921227904010014361380507973927046544666794 6905279627659399113263569398956308152294913554433653942643

SEED = a335926a a319a27a 1d00896a 6773a482 7acdac73

- c = 79d1e655 f868f02f ff48dcde e14151dd b80643c1 406d0ca10dfe6fc5 2009540a 495e8042 ea5f744f 6e184667 cc722483
- b = b3312fa7 e23ee7e4 988e056b e3f82d19 181d9c6e fe814112 0314088f 5013875a c656398d 8a2ed19d 2a85c8ed d3ec2aef
- G_x = aa87ca22 be8b0537 8eb1c71e f320ad74 6e1d3b62 8ba79b98 59f741e0 82542a38 5502f25d bf55296c 3a545e38 72760ab7
- G_y = 3617de4a 96262c6f 5d9e98bf 9292dc29 f8f41dbd 289a147c e9da3113 b5f0b8c0 0a60b1ce 1d7e819d 7a431d7c 90ea0e5f
- E.1.2.5 Curve P-521

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<i>p</i> =	686479766	5013060973	1498190079	9908139323	172694353	0014330540939	
	446345918	8554318339	9765605212	2255964060	514545549'	7729631139148	
	0858037121987999716643812574028291115057151						
n =	686479766013060971498190079908139321726943530014330540939						
	446345918554318339765539424505774633321719753296399637136						
	3321113864768612440380340372808892707005449						
SEED =	d09e8800	291cb853	96cc6717	393284aa	a0da64ba		
<i>c</i> =	0b4	8bfa5f42	0a349495	39d2bdfc	264eeeeb	077688e4	
	4fbf0ad8	f6d0edb3	7bd6b533	28100051	8e19f1b9	ffbe0fe9	
	ed8a3c22	00b8f875	e523868c	70cle5bf	55bad637		
<i>b</i> =	051	953eb961	8elc9alf	929a21a0	b68540ee	a2da725b	
	99b315f3	b8b48991	8ef109e1	56193951	ec7e937b	1652c0bd	
	3bb1bf07	3573df88	3d2c34f1	ef451fd4	6b503f00		
$G_x =$	сб	858e06b7	0404e9cd	9e3ecb66	2395b442	9c648139	
	053fb521	f828af60	6b4d3dba	a14b5e77	efe75928	feldc127	
	a2ffa8de	3348b3c1	856a429b	f97e7e31	c2e5bd66		
$G_y =$	118	39296a78	9a3bc004	5c8a5fb4	2c7d1bd9	98£54449	
	579b4468	17afbd17	273e662c	97ee7299	5ef42640	c550b901	
	3fad0761	353c7086	a272c240	88be9476	9fd16650		

E.1.3 Curves over Binary Fields

For each field degree m, a pseudo-random curve is given, along with a Koblitz curve. The pseudo-random curve has the form

$$E: y^{2} + x y = x^{3} + x^{2} + b,$$

and the Koblitz curve has the form

$$E_a: y^2 + x y = x^3 + ax^2 + 1,$$

where a = 0 or 1.

For each pseudorandom curve, the cofactor is h = 2. The cofactor of each Koblitz curve is h = 2 if a = 1, and h = 4 if a = 0.

The coefficients of the pseudo-random curves, and the coordinates of the base points of both

kinds of curves, are given in terms of both the polynomial and normal basis representations discussed in Appendix E.1.1.3.

For each *m*, the following parameters are given:

Field Representation:

- The normal basis type *T*
- The field polynomial (a trinomial or pentanomial)

Koblitz Curve:

- The coefficient *a*
- The base point order *n*
- The base point x coordinate G_x
- The base point y coordinate G_y

Pseudo-random curve:

• The base point order *n*

Pseudo-random curve (Polynomial Basis representation):

- The coefficient *b*
- The base point x coordinate G_x
- The base point y coordinate G_y

Pseudo-random curve (Normal Basis representation):

- The 160-bit input seed *SEED* to the SHA-1 based algorithm (i.e., the domain parameter seed)
- The coefficient *b* (i.e., the output of the SHA-1 based algorithm)
- The base point x coordinate G_x
- The base point y coordinate G_y

Integers (such as T, m, and n) are given in decimal form; bit strings and field elements are given in hexadecimal.

E.1.3.1 Degree 163 Binary Field

$$T = 4$$

 $p(t) = t^{163} + t^7 + t^6 + t^3 + 1$

E.1.3.1.1 Curve K-163

a = 1

n = 5846006549323611672814741753598448348329118574063 *Polynomial Basis:*

 G_x = 2 fel3c053 7bbcllac aa07d793 de4e6d5e 5c94eee8

 $G_y = 2$ 89070fb0 5d38ff58 321f2e80 0536d538 ccdaa3d9

Normal Basis:

 $G_x = 0$ 5679b353 caa46825 fea2d371 3ba450da 0c2a4541

 $G_v = 2$ 35b7c671 00506899 06bac3d9 dec76a83 5591edb2

E.1.3.1.2 Curve B-163

n = 5846006549323611672814742442876390689256843201587 *Polynomial Basis:*

b = 2 0a601907 b8c953ca 1481eb10 512f7874 4a3205fd $G_x = 3$ f0eba162 86a2d57e a0991168 d4994637 e8343e36

 $G_y = 0$ d51fbc6c 71a0094f a2cdd545 b11c5c0c 797324f1 Normal Basis:

SEED =85e25bfe5c86226cdb12016f7553f9d0e693a268b =6645f3cacf1638e139c6cd13ef61734fbc9e3d9fb $G_x =$ 0311103c17167564ace77ccb09c681f886ba54ee8 $G_y =$ 333ac13c6447f2e67613bf7009daf98c87bb50c7f

E.1.3.2 Degree 233 Binary Field

$$T = 2$$

 $p(t) = t^{233} + t^{74} + 1$

E.1.3.2.1 Curve K-233

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a = 0

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 $n = 345087317339528189371737793113851276057094098886225212 \setminus 6328087024741343$

Polynomial Basis:

 $G_x =$ 172 32ba853a 7e731af1 29f22ff4 149563a4 19c26bf5 0a4c9d6e efad6126

$$G_y =$$
 1db 537dece8 19b7f70f 555a67c4 27a8cd9b f18aeb9b
56e0c110 56fae6a3

Normal Basis:

- $G_x = 0$ fd e76d9dcd 26e643ac 26f1aa90 1aa12978 4b71fc07 22b2d056 14d650b3
- $G_y = 064$ 3e317633 155c9e04 47ba8020 a3c43177 450ee036 d6335014 34cac978

E.1.3.2.2 Curve B-233

 $n = 690174634679056378743475586227702555583981273734501355 \setminus 5379383634485463$

Polynomial Basis:

- b = 066 647ede6c 332c7f8c 0923bb58 213b333b 20e9ce42
 81fe115f 7d8f90ad
- $G_x =$ 0fa c9dfcbac 8313bb21 39f1bb75 5fef65bc 391f8b36 f8f8eb73 71fd558b
- $G_y =$ 100 6a08a419 03350678 e58528be bf8a0bef f867a7ca 36716f7e 01f81052

Normal Basis:

SEED = 74d59ff0 7f6b413d 0ea14b34 4b20a2db 049b50c3

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0c7752ad 52233279

 $G_x =$ 18b 863524b3 cdfefb94 f2784e0b 116faac5 4404bc91 62a363ba b84a14c5

$$G_y = 049 \ 25df77bd \ 8b8ff1a5 \ ff519417 \ 822bfedf \ 2bbd7526 \ 44292c98 \ c7af6e02$$

E.1.3.3 Degree 283 Binary Field

$$T = 6$$

$$p(t) = t^{283} + t^{12} + t^7 + t^5 + 1$$

E.1.3.3.1 Curve K-283

n = 3885337784451458141838923813647037813284811733793061324 295874997529815829704422603873

Polynomial Basis:

 G_x = 503213f 78ca4488 3f1a3b81 62f188e5 53cd265f 23c1567a 16876913 b0c2ac24 58492836

 G_y = 1ccda38 0f1c9e31 8d90f95d 07e5426f e87e45c0 e8184698 e4596236 4e341161 77dd2259

Normal Basis:

- G_x = 3ab9593 f8db09fc 188f1d7c 4ac9fcc3 e57fcd3b db15024b 212c7022 9de5fcd9 2eb0ea60
- G_y = 2118c47 55e7345c d8f603ef 93b98b10 6fe8854f feb9a3b3 04634cc8 3a0e759f 0c2686b1

E.1.3.3.2 Curve B-283

n = 7770675568902916283677847627294075626569625924376904889109196526770044277787378692871

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Polynomial Basis:

- b = 27b680a c8b8596d a5a4af8a 19a0303f ca97fd76 45309fa2 a581485a f6263e31 3b79a2f5
- $G_x = 5f93925 8db7dd90 e1934f8c 70b0dfec 2eed25b8 557eac9c$ 80e2e198 f8cdbecd 86b12053
- G_y = 3676854 fe24141c b98fe6d4 b20d02b4 516ff702 350eddb0 826779c8 13f0df45 be8112f4

Normal Basis:

SEED = 77e2b073 70eb0f83 2a6dd5b6 2dfc88cd 06bb84be

$$G_x =$$
 749468e 464ee468 634b21f7 f61cb700 701817e6 bc36a236
4cb8906e 940948ea a463c35d

$$G_y = 62968$$
bd 3b489ac5 c9b859da 68475c31 5bafcdc4 ccd0dc90
5b70f624 46f49c05 2f49c08c

E.1.3.4 Degree 409 Binary Field

$$T = 4$$

$$p(t) = t^{409} + t^{87} + 1$$

E.1.3.4.1 Curve K-409

a = 0

 $n = 33052798439512429947595765401638551991420234148214060964 \\232439502288071128924919105067325845777745801409636659061 \\7731358671$

Polynomial Basis:

 $G_x = 060f05f 658f49c1 ad3ab189 0f718421 0efd0987 e307c84c$ 27accfb8 f9f67cc2 c460189e b5aaaa62 ee222eb1 b35540cf e9023746

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 G_y = 1e36905 0b7c4e42 acbaldac bf04299c 3460782f 918ea427 e6325165 e9eal0e3 da5f6c42 e9c55215 aa9ca27a 5863ec48 d8e0286b

Normal Basis:

- G_x = 1b559c7 cba2422e 3affe133 43e808b5 5e012d72 6ca0b7e6 a63aeafb cle3a98e 10ca0fcf 98350c3b 7f89a975 4a8eldc0 713cec4a
- G_y = 16d8c42 052f07e7 713e7490 eff318ba 1abd6fef 8a5433c8 94b24f5c 817aeb79 852496fb ee803a47 bc8a2038 78ebf1c4 99afd7d6

E.1.3.4.2 Curve B-409

n = 6610559687902485989519153080327710398284046829642812192
84648798304157774827374805208143723762179110965979867288
366567526771

Polynomial Basis:

- b= 021a5c2 c8ee9feb 5c4b9a75 3b7b476b 7fd6422e f1f3dd67
 4761fa99 d6ac27c8 a9a197b2 72822f6c d57a55aa 4f50ae31
 7b13545f
- G_x = 15d4860 d088ddb3 496b0c60 64756260 441cde4a f1771d4d b01ffe5b 34e59703 dc255a86 8a118051 5603aeab 60794e54 bb7996a7
- G_y = 061b1cf ab6be5f3 2bbfa783 24ed106a 7636b9c5 a7bd198d 0158aa4f 5488d08f 38514f1f df4b4f40 d2181b36 81c364ba 0273c706

Normal Basis:

SEED = 4099b5a4 57f9d69f 79213d09 4c4bcd4d 4262210b

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- b = 124d065 1c3d3772 f7f5alfe 6e715559 e2129bdf a04d52f7 b6ac7c53 2cf0ed06 f610072d 88ad2fdc c50c6fde 72843670 f8b3742a
- G_x = 0ceacbc 9f475767 d8e69f3b 5dfab398 13685262 bcacf22b 84c7b6dd 981899e7 318c96f0 761f77c6 02c016ce d7c548de 830d708f
- G_y = 199d64b a8f089c6 db0e0b61 e80bb959 34afd0ca f2e8be76 dlc5e9af fc7476df 49142691 ad303902 88aa09bc c59c1573 aa3c009a

E.1.3.5 Degree 571 Binary Field

$$T = 10$$

$$p(t) = t^{571} + t^{10} + t^5 + t^2 + 1$$

E.1.3.5.1 Curve K-571

a = 0

n = 193226876150862917234767594546599367214946366485321749932861762572575957114478021226813397852270671183470671280 08253514612736749740666173119296824216170925035557336852 76673

Polynomial Basis:

- G_x = 26eb7a8 59923fbc 82189631 f8103fe4 ac9ca297 0012d5d4 60248048 01841ca4 43709584 93b205e6 47da304d b4ceb08c bbd1ba39 494776fb 988b4717 4dca88c7 e2945283 a01c8972
- G_y = 349dc80 7f4fbf37 4f4aeade 3bca9531 4dd58cec 9f307a54 ffc6lefc 006d8a2c 9d4979c0 ac44aea7 4fbebbb9 f772aedc b620b01a 7ba7af1b 320430c8 591984f6 01cd4c14 3ef1c7a3

Normal Basis:

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- G_x = 04bb2db a418d0db 107adae0 03427e5d 7cc139ac b465e593 4f0bea2a b2f3622b c29b3d5b 9aa7a1fd fd5d8be6 6057c100 8e71e484 bcd98f22 bf847642 37673674 29ef2ec5 bc3ebcf7
- G_y = 44cbb57 de20788d 2c952d7b 56cf39bd 3e89b189 84bd124e 751ceff4 369dd8da c6a59e6e 745df44d 8220ce22 aa2c852c fcbbef49 ebaa98bd 2483e331 80e04286 feaa2530 50caff60

E.1.3.5.2 Curve B-571

n = 3864537523017258344695351890931987344298927329706434998
65723525145151914228956042453614399938941577308313388112
19269444862468724628168130702345282883033324113931911052
85703

Polynomial Basis:

b= 2f40e7e 2221f295 de297117 b7f3d62f 5c6a97ff cb8ceff1cd6ba8ce 4a9a18ad 84ffabbd 8efa5933 2be7ad67 56a66e294afd185a 78ff12aa 520e4de7 39baca0c 7ffeff7f 2955727a $<math>G_x= 303001d 34b85629 6c16c0d4 0d3cd775 0a93d1d2 955fa80a$ a5f40fc8 db7b2abd bde53950 f4c0d293 cdd711a3 5b67fb1499ae6003 8614f139 4abfa3b4 c850d927 e1e7769c 8eec2d19 $<math>G_y= 37bf273 42da639b 6dccfffe b73d69d7 8c6c27a6 009cbbca$ 1980f853 3921e8a6 84423e43 bab08a57 6291af8f 461bb2a8b3531d2f 0485c19b 16e2f151 6e23dd3c 1a4827af 1b8ac15b

Normal Basis:

- SEED = 2aa058f7 3a0e33ab 486b0f61 0410c53a 7f132310
- $b = 3762d0d \ 47116006 \ 179da356 \ 88eeaccf \ 591a5cde \ a7500011 \\ 8d9608c5 \ 9132d434 \ 26101a1d \ fb377411 \ 5f586623 \ f75f0000 \\ 1ce61198 \ 3c1275fa \ 31f5bc9f \ 4be1a0f4 \ 67f01ca8 \ 85c74777 \\ G_x = 0735e03 \ 5def5925 \ cc33173e \ b2a8ce77 \ 67522b46 \ 6d278b65 \\ 0a291612 \ 7dfea9d2 \ d361089f \ 0a7a0247 \ a184e1c7 \ 0d417866 \\ \end{array}$

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e0fe0feb 0ff8f2f3 f9176418 f97d117e 624e2015 df1662a8

$$G_y$$
 = 0443642 0572616C d17e6061 CCadaeC1 C3D76dab 0eb1248C
d03fbdfc 9cd3242c 4726be57 9855e812 de7ec5c5 00b4576a
24628048 b6a72d88 0062eed0 dd34b109 6d3acbb6 b01a4a97

E.2 Implementation of Modular Arithmetic

The prime moduli in the above examples are of a special type (called *generalized Mersenne numbers*) for which modular multiplication can be carried out more efficiently than in general. This section provides the rules for implementing this faster arithmetic for each of the prime moduli appearing in the examples.

The usual way to multiply two integers (mod m) is to take the integer product and reduce it (mod m). One therefore has the following problem: given an integer A less than m^2 , compute

 $B = A \mod m$.

In general, one must obtain B as the remainder of an integer division. If m is a generalized Mersenne number, however, then B can be expressed as a sum or difference (mod m) of a small number of terms. To compute this expression, the integer sum or difference and reduce can be evaluated and the result reduced modulo m. The latter reduction can be accomplished by adding or subtracting a few copies of m.

The prime moduli *p* for each of the five example curves is a generalized Mersenne number.

E.2.1 Curve P-192

The modulus for this curve is $p = 2^{192} - 2^{64} - 1$. Every integer *A* less than p^2 can be written as

$$A = A_5 \cdot 2^{320} + A_4 \cdot 2^{256} + A_3 \cdot 2^{192} + A_2 \cdot 2^{128} + A_1 \cdot 2^{64} + A_0,$$

where each A_i is a 64-bit integer. The expression for B is

$$B = T + S_1 + S_2 + S_3 \mod p;$$

where the 192-bit terms are given by

$$T = A_2 \cdot 2^{128} + A_1 \cdot 2^{64} + A_0$$

$$S_1 = A_3 \cdot 2^{64} + A_3$$

$$S_2 = A_4 \cdot 2^{128} + A_4 \cdot 2^{64}$$

$$S_3 = A_5 \cdot 2^{128} + A_5 \cdot 2^{64} + A_5$$

E.2.2 Curve P-224

The modulus for this curve is $p = 2^{224} - 2^{96} + 1$. Every integer *A* less than p^2 can be written as:

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$$\begin{split} A &= A_{13} \cdot 2^{416} + A_{12} \cdot 2^{384} + A_{11} \cdot 2^{352} + A_{10} \cdot 2^{320} + A_9 \cdot 2^{288} + A_8 \cdot 2^{256} + A_7 \cdot 2^{224} + A_6 \cdot 2^{192} + A_5 \cdot 2^{160} + A_4 \cdot 2^{128} + A_3 \cdot 2^{96} + A_2 \cdot 2^{64} + A_1 \cdot 2^{32} + A_0. \end{split}$$

where each A_i is a 32-bit integer. As a concatenation of 32-bit words, this can be denoted by:

$$A = (A_{13} || A_{12} || \cdots || A_0).$$

The expression for B is:

$$B = T + S_1 + S_2 - D_1 - D_2 \mod p$$
,

where the 224-bit terms are given by:

$$T = (A_6 || A_5 || A_4 || A_3 || A_2 || A_1 || A_0)$$

$$S_1 = (A_{10} || A_9 || A_8 || A_7 || 0 || 0 || 0)$$

$$S_2 = (0 || A_{13} || A_{12} || A_{11} || 0 || 0 || 0)$$

$$D_1 = (A_{13} || A_{12} || A_{11} || A_{10} || A_9 || A_8 || A_7)$$

$$D_2 = (0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || A_{13} || A_{12} || A_{11}).$$

E.2.3 Curve P-256

The modulus for this curve is $p = 2^{256} - 2^{224} + 2^{192} + 2^{96} - 1$. Every integer A less than p^2 can be written as:

$$\begin{split} A &= A_{15} \cdot 2^{480} + A_{14} \cdot 2^{448} + A_{13} \cdot 2^{416} + A_{12} \cdot 2^{384} + A_{11} \cdot 2^{352} + A_{10} \cdot 2^{320} + A_{9} \cdot 2^{288} + A_{8} \cdot 2^{256} + A_{7} \cdot 2^{224} + A_{6} \cdot 2^{192} + A_{5} \cdot 2^{160} + A_{4} \cdot 2^{128} + A_{3} \cdot 2^{96} + A_{2} \cdot 2^{64} + A_{1} \cdot 2^{32} + A_{0}. \end{split}$$

where each A_i is a 32-bit integer. As a concatenation of 32-bit words, this can be denoted by

$$A = (A_{15} || A_{14} || \cdots || A_0).$$

The expression for *B* is:

$$B = T + 2S_1 + 2S_2 + S_3 + S_4 - D_1 - D_2 - D_3 - D_4 \mod p,$$

where the 256-bit terms are given by:

$$T = (A_7 || A_6 || A_5 || A_4 || A_3 || A_2 || A_1 || A_0)$$

$$S_1 = (A_{15} || A_{14} || A_{13} || A_{12} || A_{11} || 0 || 0 || 0)$$

$$S_2 = (0 || A_{15} || A_{14} || A_{13} || A_{12} || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0)$$

$$S_3 = (A_{15} || A_{14} || 0 || 0 || 0 || A_{10} || A_9 || A_8)$$

$$S_4 = (A_8 || A_{13} || A_{15} || A_{14} || A_{13} || A_{11} || A_{10} || A_9)$$

$$D_1 = (A_{10} || A_8 || 0 || 0 || 0 || A_{13} || A_{12} || A_{11})$$

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 A_5

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 $D_2 = (A_{11} || A_9 || 0 || 0 || A_{15} || A_{14} || A_{13} || A_{12})$ $D_3 = (A_{12} || 0 || A_{10} || A_9 || A_8 || A_{15} || A_{14} || A_{13})$ $D_4 = (A_{13} || 0 || A_{11} || A_{10} || A_9 || 0 || A_{15} || A_{14})$

E.2.4 Curve P-384

The modulus for this curve is $p = 2^{384} - 2^{128} - 2^{96} + 2^{32} - 1$. Every integer *A* less than p^2 can be written as:

$$\begin{split} A &= A_{23} \cdot 2^{736} + A_{22} \cdot 2^{704} + A_{21} \cdot 2^{672} + A_{20} \cdot 2^{640} + A_{19} \cdot 2^{608} + A_{18} \cdot 2^{576} + A_{17} \cdot 2^{544} + A_{16} \cdot 2^{512} + A_{15} \cdot 2^{480} + A_{14} \cdot 2^{448} + A_{13} \cdot 2^{416} + A_{12} \cdot 2^{384} + A_{11} \cdot 2^{352} + A_{10} \cdot 2^{320} + A_{9} \cdot 2^{288} + A_{8} \cdot 2^{256} + A_{7} \cdot 2^{224} + A_{6} \cdot 2^{192} + A_{5} \cdot 2^{160} + A_{4} \cdot 2^{128} + A_{3} \cdot 2^{96} + A_{2} \cdot 2^{64} + A_{1} \cdot 2^{32} + A_{0}. \end{split}$$

where each A_i is a 32-bit integer. As a concatenation of 32-bit words, this can be denoted by

 $A = (A_{23} || A_{22} || \cdots || A_0).$

The expression for *B* is:

$$B = T + 2S_1 + S_2 + S_3 + S_4 + S_5 + S_6 - D_1 - D_2 - D_3 \mod p,$$

where the 384-bit terms are given by:

E.2.5 Curve P-521

The modulus for this curve is $p = 2^{521} - 1$. Every integer A less than p^2 can be written $A = A_1 \cdot 2^{521} + A_0$,

The expression for *B* is:

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 $B = A_0 + A_1 \mod p.$

E.3 Normal Bases

The elements of $GF(2^m)$ are expressed in terms of the type *T* normal basis³ *B* for $GF(2^m)$, for some *T*. Each element has a unique representation as a bit string:

 $(a_0 a_1 \ldots a_{m-1})$

The arithmetic operations are performed as follows.

<u>Addition</u>: addition of two elements is implemented by bit-wise addition modulo 2. Thus, for example,

(1100111) + (1010010) = (0110101).

Squaring: if

 $\alpha = (a_0 a_1 \ldots a_{m-1})$

then

$$\alpha^2 = (a_{m-1} a_0 a_1 \dots a_{m-2})$$

<u>Multiplication</u>: to perform multiplication, a function $F(\underline{u},\underline{v})$ is constructed on inputs

 $\underline{u} = (u_0 u_1 \dots u_{m-1})$ and $\underline{v} = (v_0 v_1 \dots v_{m-1})$

as follows.

- 1. Set $p \leftarrow Tm + 1$.
- 2. Let *u* be an integer having order *T* modulo *p*.
- 3. Compute the sequence F(1); F(2), ..., F(p-1) as follows:
 - 3.1 Set $w \leftarrow 1$.
 - 3.2 For *j* from 0 to *T*-1 do
 - 3.2.1 Set $n \leftarrow w$.
 - 3.2.2 For i = 0 to m-1 do
 - 3.2.2.1 Set $F(n) \leftarrow i$.
 - 3.2.2.2 Set $n \leftarrow 2n \mod p$.
 - 3.2.3 Set $w \leftarrow uw \mod p$.
- 4. Output the formula:

³ It is assumed in this section that m is odd and T is even, since this is the only case considered in this Standard.

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$$F(u,v) := \sum_{k=1}^{p-2} u_{F(k+1)} v_{F(p-k)}.$$

This computation need only be performed once per basis.

Given the function *F* for *B*, the product

$$(c_0 c_1 \ldots c_{m-1}) = (a_0 a_1 \ldots a_{m-1}) \times (b_0 b_1 \ldots b_{m-1})$$

is computed as follows:

- 1. Set $(u_0 u_1 \ldots u_{m-1}) \leftarrow (a_0 a_1 \ldots a_{m-1})$.
- 2. Set $(v_0 v_1 \dots v_{m-1}) \leftarrow (b_0 b_1 \dots b_{m-1})$.
- 3. For k = 0 to m 1 do
 - 3.1 Compute

$$c_k = F(\underline{u}, \underline{v}).$$

- 3.2 Set $u \leftarrow$ LeftShift (*u*) and $v \leftarrow$ LeftShift (*v*), where LeftShift denotes the circular left shift operation.
- 4. Output $c = (c_0 c_1 \dots c_{m-1})$.

Example: For the type 4 normal basis for $GF(2^7)$, p = 29 and u = 12 or 17. Thus, the values of F are given by:

$$F(1) = 0 \quad F(8) = 3 \quad F(15) = 6 \quad F(22) = 5$$

$$F(2) = 1 \quad F(9) = 3 \quad F(16) = 4 \quad F(23) = 6$$

$$F(3) = 5 \quad F(10) = 2 \quad F(17) = 0 \quad F(24) = 1$$

$$F(4) = 2 \quad F(11) = 4 \quad F(18) = 4 \quad F(25) = 2$$

$$F(5) = 1 \quad F(12) = 0 \quad F(19) = 2 \quad F(26) = 5$$

$$F(6) = 6 \quad F(13) = 4 \quad F(20) = 3 \quad F(27) = 1$$

$$F(7) = 5 \quad F(14) = 6 \quad F(21) = 3 \quad F(28) = 0$$

Therefore,

$$F(\underline{u}; \underline{v}) = u_0 v_1 + u_1 (v_0 + v_2 + v_5 + v_6) + u_2 (v_1 + v_3 + v_4 + v_5) + u_3 (v_2 + v_5) + u_4 (v_2 + v_6) + u_5 (v_1 + v_2 + v_3 + v_6) + u_6 (v_1 + v_4 + v_5 + v_6).$$

Thus, if

$$a = (1 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1)$$
 and $b = (1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1)$,

then

$$c_0 = F((1\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 1\ 1\ 1), (1\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1)) = 1,$$

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$$c_1 = F((0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1), (1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1)) = 0,$$

 \vdots
 $c_6 = F((1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1); (1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0)) = 1,$

so that $c = ab = (1 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1)$.

E.4 Scalar Multiplication on Koblitz Curves

This section describes a particularly efficient method of computing the scalar multiple nP on the Koblitz curve E_a over $GF(2^m)$.

The operation τ is defined by:

$$\tau(x, y) = (x^2, y^2)$$

When the normal basis representation is used, then the operation τ is implemented by performing right circular shifts on the bit strings representing *x* and *y*.

Given *m* and *a*, define the following parameters:

- *C* is some integer greater than 5.
- $\mu = (-1)^{1-a}$
- For i = 0 and i = 1, define the sequence $s_i(m)$ by:

$$s_i(0) = 0, \quad s_i(1) = 1 - i,$$

 $s_i(m) = \mu \bullet s_i(m - 1) - 2 s_i(m - 2) + (-1)^i$

• Define the sequence *V*(*m*)

$$V(0) = 2, V(1) = \mu$$

 $V(m) = \mu \bullet v(m-1) - 2V(m-2).$

For the example curves, the quantities $s_i(m)$ and V(m) are as follows.

Curve K-163:

 $s_0(163) = 2579386439110731650419537$

- $s_1(163) = -755360064476226375461594$
- V(163) = -4845466632539410776804317

Curve K-233:

- $s_0(233) = -27859711741434429761757834964435883$
- $s_1(233) = -44192136247082304936052160908934886$
- V(233) = -137381546011108235394987299651366779

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Curve K-283:

 $s_0(283) = -665981532109049041108795536001591469280025$

 $s_1(283) = 1155860054909136775192281072591609913945968$

V(283) = 7777244870872830999287791970962823977569917

Curve K-409:

 $s_0(409) = -18307510456002382137810317198756461378590542487556869338419259$

 $s_1(409) = -8893048526138304097196653241844212679626566100996606444816790$

V(409)= 10457288737315625927447685387048320737638796957687575791173829

Curve K-571:

- $s_0(571) = -3737319446876463692429385892476115567147293964596131024123406420 \land 235241916729983261305$
- $s_1(571) = -3191857706446416099583814595948959674131968912148564658610565117 \setminus 58982848515832612248752$

V(571)= -1483809269816914138996191402970514903645425741804939362329123395\ 34208516828973111459843

The following algorithm computes the scalar multiple nP on the Koblitz curve E_a over $GF(2^m)$. The average number of elliptic additions and subtractions is at most ~ 1 + (m/3), and is at most ~ m/3 with probability at least 1 - 2^{5-C} .

1. For
$$i = 0$$
 to 1 do

- 1.1 $n' \leftarrow |n/2^{a-C+(m-9)/2}|$.
- 1.2 $g' \leftarrow s_i(m) \cdot n'$.
- 1.3 $h' \leftarrow \lfloor g'/2^m \rfloor$.
- 1.4 $j' \leftarrow V(m) \cdot h'$.
- 1.5 $l' \leftarrow \text{Round}((g'+j')/2^{(m+5)/2}).$
- 1.6 $\lambda_i \leftarrow l'/2^C$.
- 1.7 $f_i \leftarrow \text{Round}(\lambda_i)$.
- 1.8 $\eta_i \leftarrow \lambda_i f_{i..}$
- 1.9 $h_i \leftarrow 0$.
- 2. $\eta \leftarrow 2 \eta_0 + \mu \eta_1$

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then

3. If $(\eta \ge 1)$,

if $(\eta_o - 3 \mu \eta_1 < -1)$ then set $h_1 \leftarrow \mu$ else set $h_0 \leftarrow 1$.

else

if
$$(\eta_0 + 4 \mu \eta_1 \ge 2)$$

then set $h_1 \leftarrow \mu$.

4. If $(\eta < -1)$

then

if
$$(\eta_0 - 3 \ \mu \ \eta_1 \ge 1)$$

then set $h_1 \leftarrow -\mu$
else set $h_0 \leftarrow -1$.

else

if
$$(\eta_0 + 4 \mu \eta_1 < -2)$$

then set $h_1 \leftarrow -\mu$.

5.
$$q_0 \leftarrow f_0 + h_0$$
.

6.
$$q_1 \leftarrow f_1 + h_1$$
.

- 7. $r_0 \leftarrow n (s_0 + \mu s_1) q_0 2s_1 q_1$.
- 8. $r_1 \leftarrow s_1 q_0 s_0 q_1$.
- 9. Set $Q \leftarrow O$.
- 10. $P_0 \leftarrow P$.
- 11. While $((r_0 \neq 0) \text{ or } (r_1 \neq 0))$
 - 11.1 If $(r_0 \text{ odd})$, then
 - 11.1.1 set $u \leftarrow 2 (r_0 2 r_1 \mod 4)$.
 - 11.1.2 set $r_0 \leftarrow r_0 u$.
 - 11.1.3 if (u = 1), then set $Q \leftarrow Q + P_0$.
 - 11.1.4 if (u = -1), then set $Q \leftarrow Q P_0$.

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11.2 Set $P_0 \leftarrow \tau P_0$. 11.3Set $(r_0, r_1) \leftarrow (r_1 + \mu r_0/2, -r_0/2)$. Endwhile

12. Output *Q*.

E.5 Generation of Pseudo-Random Curves (Prime Case)

Let *l* be the bit length of *p*, and define

$$v = \lfloor (l-1)/160 \rfloor$$
$$w = l - 160v - 1$$

- 1. Choose an arbitrary 160-bit string *s* as the domain parameter seed.
- 2. Compute h = SHA-1(s).
- 3. Let h_0 be the bit string obtained by taking the *w* rightmost bits of *h*.
- 4. Let *z* be the integer whose binary expansion is given by the 160-bit string *s*.
- 5. For *i* from 1 to *v* do:
 - 5.1 Define the 160-bit string s_i to be binary expansion of the integer

$$(z+i) \mod (2^{160}).$$

5.2 Compute $h_i = \text{SHA-1}(s_i)$.

6. Let *h* be the bit string obtained by the concatenation of h_0 , h_1 , ..., h_v as follows:

$$h=h_0\parallel h_1\parallel\ldots\parallel h_{\nu}.$$

- 7. Let *c* be the integer whose binary expansion is given by the bit string *h*.
- 8. If $((c = 0 \text{ or } 4c + 27 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}))$, then go to Step 1.
- 9. Choose integers $a, b \in GF(p)$ such that

$$c \ b^2 \equiv a^3 \ (\mathrm{mod} \ p).$$

(The simplest choice is a = c and b = c. However, one may want to choose differently for performance reasons.)

10. Check that the elliptic curve *E* over GF(p) given by $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ has suitable order. If not, go to Step 1.

E.6 Verification of Curve Pseudo-Randomness (Prime Case)

Given the 160-bit domain parameter seed value *s*, verify that the coefficient *b* was obtained from *s* via the cryptographic hash function SHA-1 as follows.

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Let *l* be the bit length of *p*, and define

$$v = \lfloor (l-1)/160 \rfloor$$
$$w = l - 160v - 1$$

- 1. Compute h = SHA-1(s).
- 2. Let h_0 be the bit string obtained by taking the *w* rightmost bits of *h*.
- 3. Let z be the integer whose binary expansion is given by the 160-bit string s.
- 4. For i = 1 to v do
 - 4.1 Define the 160-bit string s_i to be binary expansion of the integer

$$(z+i) \mod (2^{160}).$$

- 4.2 Compute $h_i = \text{SHA-1}(s_i)$.
- 5. Let *h* be the bit string obtained by the concatenation of h_0 , h_1 , ..., h_v as follows:

$$h=h_0\parallel h_1\parallel\ldots\parallel h_{\nu}.$$

- 6. Let c be the integer whose binary expansion is given by the bit string h.
- 7. Verify that $b^2 c \equiv -27 \pmod{p}$.

E.7 Generation of Pseudo-Random Curves (Binary Case)

Let:

$$v = \lfloor (m - 1) / B \rfloor$$
$$w = m - Bv$$

- 1. Choose an arbitrary 160-bit string *s* as the domain parameter seed.
- 2. Compute h = SHA-1(s)
- 3. Let h_0 be the bit string obtained by taking the *w* rightmost bits of *h*.
- 4. Let *z* be the integer whose binary expansion is given by the 160-bit string *s*.
- 5. For *i* from 1 to *v* do:
 - 5.1 Define the 160-bit string s_i to be binary expansion of the integer $(z + i) \mod (2^{160})$.
 - 5.2 Compute $h_i = \text{SHA-1}(s_i)$.
- 6. Let *h* be the bit string obtained by the concatenation of h_0 , h_1 , ..., h_v as follows:

 $h=h_0 \parallel h_1 \parallel \ldots \parallel h_{\nu}.$

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- 7. Let b be the element of $GF(2^m)$ which binary expansion is given by the bit string h.
- 8. Choose an element *a* of $GF(2^m)$.
- 9. Check that the elliptic curve E over $GF(2^m)$ given by $y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b$ has suitable order. If not, go to Step 1.

E.8 Verification of Curve Pseudo-Randomness (Binary Case)

Given the 160-bit domain parameter seed value s, verify that the coefficient b was obtained from s via the cryptographic hash function SHA-1 as follows.

Define

$$v = \lfloor (m - 1) / 160 \rfloor$$
$$w = m - 160v$$

- 1. Compute h = SHA-1(s).
- 2. Let h_0 be the bit string obtained by taking the *w* rightmost bits of *h*.
- 3. Let *z* be the integer whose binary expansion is given by the 160-bit string *s*.
- 4. For i = 1 to v do
 - 4.1 Define the 160-bit string s_i to be binary expansion of the integer $(z + i) \mod (2^{160})$.
 - 4.2 Compute $h_i = \text{SHA-1}(s_i)$.
- 5. Let *h* be the bit string obtained by the concatenation of h_0 , h_1 , ..., h_v as follows:

$$h=h_0 \parallel h_1 \parallel \ldots \parallel h_{\nu}.$$

- 6. Let c be the element of $GF(2^m)$ which is represented by the bit string h.
- 7. Verify that c = b.

E.9 Polynomial Basis to Normal Basis Conversion

Suppose that α an element of the field $GF(2^m)$. Let p be the bit string representing α with respect to a given polynomial basis. It is desired to compute n, the bit string representing α with respect to a given normal basis. This is done via the matrix computation

$$p \Gamma = n,$$

where Γ is an *m*-by-*m* matrix with entries in *GF*(2). The matrix Γ , which depends only on the bases, can be computed easily given its second-to-last row. The second-to-last row for each conversion is given in the below.

<u>Degree 163:</u>

3 e173bfaf 3a86434d 883a2918 a489ddbd 69fe84e1

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Degree 233:

Obe 19b89595 28bbc490 038f4bc4 da8bdfc1 ca36bb05 853fd0ed 0ae200ce

Degree 283:

3347f17 521fdabc 62ec1551 acf156fb 0bceb855 f174d4c1 7807511c 9f745382 add53bc3

Degree 409:

0eb00f2 ea95fd6c 64024e7f 0b68b81f 5ff8a467 acc2b4c3 b9372843 6265c7ff a06d896c ae3a7e31 e295ec30 3eb9f769 de78bef5

Degree 571:

```
7940ffa ef996513 4d59dcbf e5bf239b e4fe4b41 05959c5d 4d942ffd
46ea35f3 e3cdb0e1 04a2aa01 cef30a3a 49478011 196bfb43 c55091b6
1174d7c0 8d0cdd61 3bf6748a bad972a4
```

Given the second-to-last row r of Γ , the rest of the matrix is computed as follows. Let β be the element of $GF(2^m)$ whose representation with respect to the normal basis is r. Then the rows of Γ , from top to bottom, are the bit strings representing the elements

$$\beta^{m-1}, \beta^{m-2}, \ldots, \beta^2, \beta, 1$$

with respect to the normal basis. (Note that the element 1 is represented by the all-1 bit string.)

Alternatively, the matrix is the inverse of the matrix described in Appendix E.10.

More details of these computations can be found in Annex A.7 of the IEEE P1363 standard.

E.10 Normal Basis to Polynomial Basis Conversion

Suppose that α an element of the field $GF(2^m)$. Let *n* be the bit string representing α with respect to a given normal basis. It is desired to compute *p*, the bit string representing α with respect to a given polynomial basis. This is done via the matrix computation

 $n \Gamma = p$

where Γ is an *m*-by-*m* matrix with entries in *GF*(2). The matrix Γ , which depends only on the bases, can be computed easily given its top row. The top row for each conversion is given below.

<u>Degree 163:</u>

7 15169c10 9c612e39 0d347c74 8342bcd3 b02a0bef

Degree 233:

149 9e398ac5 d79e3685 59b35ca4 9bb7305d a6c0390b cf9e2300 253203c9

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Degree 283:

31e0ed7 91c3282d c5624a72 0818049d 053e8c7a b8663792 bc1d792e ba9867fc 7b317a99

<u>Degree 409:</u>

Odfa06b e206aa97 b7a41fff b9b0c55f 8f048062 fbe8381b 4248adf9 2912ccc8 e3f91a24 e1cfb395 0532b988 971c2304 2e85708d

<u>Degree 571:</u>

452186b bf5840a0 bcf8c9f0 2a54efa0 4e813b43 c3d41496 06c4d27b 487bf107 393c8907 f79d9778 beb35ee8 7467d328 8274caeb da6ce05a eb4ca5cf 3c3044bd 4372232f 2c1a27c4

Given the top row r of Γ , the rest of the matrix is computed as follows. Let β be the element of $GF(2^m)$ whose representation with respect to the polynomial basis is r. Then the rows of Γ , from top to bottom, are the bit strings representing the elements

$$\beta, \beta^2, \beta^{2^2}, ..., \beta^{2^{m-1}}$$

with respect to the polynomial basis.

Alternatively, the matrix is the inverse of the matrix described in Appendix E.9.

More details of these computations can be found in Annex A.7 of the IEEE P1363 standard.

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Appendix F: A Proof that v = r in the DSA

The purpose of this appendix is to show that if M' = M, r' = r and s' = s in the signature verification, then v = r'. Let SHA(...) be an Approved hash function. The following result is needed.

Lemma: Let p and q be primes such that q divides (p - 1), let h be a positive integer less than p, and let $g = (h(p-1)/q \mod p)$. Then $(g^q \mod p) = 1$, and if $(m \mod q) = (n \mod q)$, then $(g^m \mod p) = (g^n \mod p)$.

Proof:

$$g^{p} \operatorname{mod} p = (h^{(p-1)/q} \operatorname{mod} p)^{q} \operatorname{mod} p$$
$$= h^{(p-1)} \operatorname{mod} p$$
$$= 1$$

by Fermat's Little Theorem. Now let $(m \mod q) = (n \mod q)$, i.e., m = (n + kq) for some integer k. Then

$$g^{m} \mod p = g^{n + kq} \mod p$$
$$= (g^{n} g^{kq}) \mod p$$
$$= ((g^{n} \mod p) (g^{q} \mod p)^{k}) \mod p$$
$$= g^{n} \mod p$$
since $(g^{q} \mod p) = 1$.

Proof of the main result:

Theorem: If M' = M, r' = r, and s' = s in the signature verification, then v = r'. Proof:

$$w = (s')^{-1} \mod q = s^{-1} \mod q$$

 $u1 = ((\text{Hash}(M'))w) \mod q = ((\text{Hash}(M))w) \mod q$
 $u2 = ((r')w) \mod q = (rw) \mod q.$

Now $y = (g^x \mod p)$, so that by the lemma,

$$v = ((g^{u1} y^{u2}) \mod p) \mod q$$
$$= ((g^{\operatorname{Hash}(M)w} y^{rw}) \mod p) \mod q$$
$$= ((g^{\operatorname{Hash}(M)w} g^{xrw}) \mod p) \mod q$$
$$= ((g^{(\operatorname{Hash}(M) + xr)w)} \mod p) \mod q.$$

Also:

$$s = (k^{-1} (\operatorname{Hash}(M) + xr)) \mod q.$$

Hence:

$$w = (k (\operatorname{Hash}(M) + xr)^{-1}) \mod q$$

$$(\operatorname{Hash}(M) + xr)w \mod q = k \mod q.$$

Thus, by the lemma:

 $v = (g^k \bmod p) \bmod q = r$